

How Freedom is Won

From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy

A Research Study by





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Study Team

Study Director

Adrian Karatnycky

Study Advisor

Peter Ackerman

Study Researcher

Mark Y. Rosenberg

Study Assistants

Sanja Tatic

Alex Taurel

Study Advisors on Methodology

Tom Carothers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Jack DuVall (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict)

Dr. Joshua Murvachik (American Enterprise Institute)

Prof. Kurt Schock (Rutgers University)

Academic Reviewers

Prof. Michael McFaul (Stanford University)

Prof. Robert Rotberg (Harvard University)

Dr. Michael Shifter (Inter-American Dialogue)

Prof. Bridget Welsh (Johns Hopkins SAIS)

Statistician/Advisor


Dr. Jay Verkuilen (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)



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Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman



In recent months, the worldwide struggle for democracy has gained increased prominence in international affairs.

In late March 2005, mass demonstrations helped topple Kyrgyzstan's authoritarian president. On March 14th, approximately one million Lebanese took to the streets in a remarkable display of nonviolent civic power to press for democracy and demand an end to Syria's military presence in their country.

In November-December 2004, the international community was surprised by the scale and perseverance of nonviolent civic resistance in Ukraine, as millions of citizens successfully pressed for free and fair elections in what became known as the Orange Revolution. But Ukraine's Orange Revolution was only the latest in a series of successful "people power" revolutions that include the Philippines in 1986; Chile and Poland, in 1988; Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia in 1989; the Baltic States in 1991; South Africa in 1994; Serbia and Peru in 2000; and Georgia in 2003. The proliferation and success of such civic resistance movements in effecting political transitions is spawning increased international discussion of the mechanisms by which democracy replaces tyranny.

World leaders are taking notice. In his January 2005 inaugural address, U.S. President George W. Bush focused on global trends that are contributing to the spread of freedom and democracy. That speech and statements by other leaders, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the European Union's Foreign Affairs Commissioner Javier Solana, have helped place on the front burner the question of how best to promote democratic change and to build the infrastructure of stable democratic life.

Growing international discourse about democratization is not a theoretical exercise. In the last three decades, dozens of corrupt, authoritarian, autocratic, one-party, and military regimes have fallen. As empires, multinational states, and colonial systems have receded, new states have emerged. Dictatorships collapse and new states and new democracies arise by a variety of means.

As this study shows, far more often than is generally understood, the change agent is broad-based, nonviolent civic resistance—which employs tactics such as boycotts, mass protests, blockades, strikes, and civil disobedience to de-legitimate authoritarian rulers and erode their sources of support, including the loyalty of their armed defenders.

In other cases, transitions are generated by a combination of domestic civic pressure and reformers within the powerholding elite. Sometimes powerholders switch sides and lend their support to an increasingly powerful civic movement. Political liberalization is

also initiated from the top down, by formerly authoritarian powerholders who seek to avert a social explosion, promote growth, or avoid international sanctions. At times, political rights and civil liberties advance through the actions of outside forces, including military and peacekeeping interventions by other states, regional organizations, and the broader international community. In a world in which tyranny is facing increased resistance, these factors and the long-term outcomes they produce deserve increased analysis and understanding.

Data for this study is based in part on original research and in part on narratives and political rights and civil liberties ratings taken from *Freedom in the World*, which has been produced annually for 33 years by Freedom House. The Freedom in the World data set reflects numerous political transitions and dozens of new democracies and “Free” polities that have come into existence since the survey was launched. According to more than three decades of survey data, the number of Free states, which ensure a broad array of political rights and civil liberties, has expanded from 43 to 88—an average of nearly 1.5 per year—while the number of Not Free states, where repression is widespread, has declined from 69 to 49, or by nearly 2 every 3 years.

The central conclusion of this study is that how a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the types of forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform.

In addition, statistical testing of the data for the effect of time on the scores did not produce any dramatic improvements for freedom. This suggests that in a preponderance of successful transitions, the most dramatic improvements in freedom tend to come quickly—in the first years of a transition, rather than slowly and incrementally over a long period of time, underscoring the importance of the nature of the civic and political forces that emerge as important actors in the pre-transition period.



This study examines a large array of long-term data about political openings, transitions from authoritarianism, political rights, and civil liberties in order to better understand how key characteristics of the period prior to a transition correlate with the eventual outcome for freedom and democratic practice. The report looks at the pre-transition environment in 67 countries where transitions from authoritarianism occurred, and assesses and codes them according to three key characteristics: a) the sources of violence that were present prior to the political opening; b) the degree of civic (bottom-up) versus powerholder (top-down) influence on the process; and c) the strength and cohesion of a nonviolent civic coalition.

The study then correlates these three transition characteristics with the degree of freedom that exists today, some years after the transition. It does so by employing the ratings used in the Freedom in the World survey according to its broad categories of Free (countries where there is compliance with a wide array of political rights and civil liberties), Partly Free (countries with some significant limitations on these rights and liberties), and Not Free (countries where basic political rights and civil liberties are widely and systematically denied). It also correlates them to the post-transition state of freedom as reflected in the survey’s nuanced numerical ratings for political rights and civil liberties. The numerical ratings used in the Freedom House survey are assigned on a 1-to-7 scale, with 1 representing a high level of democratic political practices and effective adherence to fundamental civil liberties, and 7 representing the absence of all political rights and massive and systematic human rights violations. For the purposes of this study, we have taken each country’s scores for political rights and civil liberties and generated a combined average, again with 1 representing best practices and 7 the worst and most repressive setting for basic rights and liberties.

Each country in which a transition has occurred over the last 3 decades is evaluated in each of the three categories and accompanied by a short narrative that describes the salient events in the period leading up to the transition. A detailed methodology is included as an appendix to the report.

Focus of the Study

This study covers transitions that have occurred over the last 33 years, as these are the years for which the annual Freedom in the World survey has produced comprehensive annual ratings data. Therefore, the post-war transitions to democracy in Western Europe and Japan were excluded.

We also have excluded transitions that occurred in small countries, defined as those with populations of less than one million. Excluded, too, are countries where major political transitions occurred in the last two years. We therefore do not include the recent events in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine's transition of December 2004, or Georgia's of 2003. This is because there has not been a sufficient interval since the transition from authoritarian or pseudo-democratic rule to make firm assessments about the nature or durability of post-transition change in countries where institutional, political, legal, and human rights environments are still evolving or where reforms either have not yet been launched or fully implemented.

In the context of the above limitations, the study has applied the following definitions to the term "political transition": the establishment of a new government as a result of the fragmentation of larger state units (e.g., Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, USSR); as a result of the end of one-person dictatorships, military dictatorships, and one-party rule; or due to the end of authoritarian dominant-party systems. This definition, therefore, excludes cases where one form of tyranny or dictatorship immediately has been replaced with another, such as a coup d'état that deposes one military leader only to replace him with another or the toppling of a monarchy or personalistic dictatorship and its replacement with military or junta rule. For example, we do not include Turkmenistan, where one-party Soviet rule was quickly replaced with one-man dictatorship. However, we do include Uzbekistan, because there a new state emerged in place of the Soviet one-party dictatorship and briefly permitted limited space for multiparty political activity—although the country since has banned most opposition parties and organizations and is now a Not Free polity.

Because we are measuring transitions from previously closed, authoritarian, or tyrannical systems, none of the countries in our list was rated Free in the year before the transition. In the end, our review found 67 countries that satisfy the above definitions and limitations. These "transition countries" represent over one-third of the world's 192 countries.

Principal Findings: How Freedom Is Won

What are the study's principal findings?

First, "people power" movements matter, because nonviolent civic forces are a major source of pressure for decisive change in most transitions. The force of civic resistance was a key factor in driving 50 of 67 transitions, or over 70 percent of countries where transitions began as dictatorial systems fell and/or new states arose from the disintegration of multinational states. Of the 50 countries where civic resistance was a key strategy (i.e., either countries in which there

were transitions driven by civic forces or countries where there were mixed transitions involving significant input from both civic forces and powerholders), none were Free countries, 25 were Partly Free countries, and 25 were Not Free countries. Today, years after the transition 32 of these countries are Free, 14 are Partly Free, and only 4 are Not Free. [Tables 2a and 2b]

Second, there is comparatively little positive effect for freedom in “top-down” transitions that were launched and led by elites. Before transition, no such countries were Free, 6 were Partly Free and 8 were Not Free, while today, post-transition, 2 are Free, 8 are Partly Free and 4 are Not Free. On a 7-point rating scale, top down transitions led to an improvement of 1.10 points in the combined average freedom score, while transitions with strong civic drivers led to an improvement of nearly 2.7 points on the same 1-to-7 scale. [Tables 2c and 2d, Graph 2a]

Of the 35 Free countries post-transition, 32 (or more than 9 in 10) had a significant “bottom up” civic resistance component. Twenty-two (63 percent) of them had mixed transitions, driven by a combination of civic resistance forces and segments of the powerholders, while 10 (29 percent) had openings driven by primarily by the force of civic resistance. Only two transitions that have led to high levels of freedom today were driven from the top-down by powerholders and one by external military intervention.

Among the 23 Partly Free countries post-transition, 7 (30 percent) of transitions were civic driven, 7 (30 percent) were mixed, 8 (35 percent) were driven by powerholders, and 1 (4 percent) emerged after an external military intervention. Among the 9 Not Free countries post-transition, one transition (11 percent) was civic led, three (33 percent) were mixed, four (44 percent) were driven by powerholders, and one (11 percent) was driven by external military intervention. [Graph 2b]

Third, the presence of strong and cohesive nonviolent civic coalitions is the most important of the factors examined in contributing to freedom.

In 32 of the 67 countries (nearly 48 percent) that have seen transitions, strong, broad-based nonviolent popular fronts or civic coalitions were highly active, and in many cases central to steering the process of change. In these 32 instances, prior to the transition there had been no Free countries, 17 Partly Free countries, and 15 Not Free countries. Now, years after the transition, 24 of the countries (75 percent) where a strong nonviolent civic movement was present are Free and democratic states and 8 (25 percent) are Partly Free states with some space for civic and political life, while none of the states whose transitions featured a strong civic force are Not Free. [Table 1a]

In countries where there have been robust and cohesive coalitions employing tactics of nonviolent resistance, the mean Freedom in the World numerical rating improved from 5.33 pre-transition to 2.09 now, a jump of 3.24 points. This is a marked increase given that the overall scale in the survey is 1 (best) to 7 (worst), as explained above. In countries where cohesive and broadly based nonviolent civic coalitions represented a moderately strong presence, the numerical freedom score improved from a 5.11 pre-transition average to 3.39 today, an improvement of 1.72 points. In transitions where nonviolent civic forces were weak or absent, the scores moved from 5.47 in the year prior to the transition to 4.15 now, an improvement of 1.32 points: less than half the change experienced in transitions in which there was a strong and cohesive nonviolent movement. In other words, the stronger and more cohesive the nonviolent civic coalition operating in societies in the years immediately preceding the transition, the deeper the transformation in the direction of freedom and democracy. [Graph 1a]

Regression analysis indicates that the presence of a cohesive nonviolent civic coalition during the period of transition has a highly statistically significant effect on increasing the level of freedom.

Among the 35 post-transition Free countries, 24 (69 percent) had strong nonviolent civic coalitions, 8 (23 percent) had moderately strong civic coalitions, and only 3 (8 percent) had movements that were weak or absent in the two-year period leading up to the opening for the transition. By contrast, among countries that are Partly Free now, 8 (35 percent) had “strong” civic coalitions, 7 (30 percent) were “moderate,” and 8 (35 percent) were “weak or absent.” Among countries that are now Not Free, the distribution was zero “strong,” 3 (33 percent) “moderate,” and 6 (67 percent) “weak or absent.” [Graph 1b]

Fourth, the data suggests that the prospects for freedom are significantly enhanced when the opposition does not itself use violence. In all there were 47 transitions in which there was no (or almost no) opposition violence. Before the transition, none were Free, 23 were Partly Free, and 24 were Not Free. Today, years after the transition, 31 are Free, 11 are Partly Free, and 5 are Not Free. The mean freedom rating in these 47 cases was 5.22 pre-transition and 2.53 years after the political opening. Then net improvement was 2.69, a very significant gain for freedom on the 1-to-7 freedom scale. [Table 4a]

By contrast, in countries where the opposition employed violence, pre-transition, none were Free, 8 were Partly Free, and 12 were Not Free. Today, 4 are Free, 12 are Partly Free, and 4 are Not Free. As significantly, the mean freedom score of this cohort of countries improved 1.52 points years after the transition, compared to the 2.69-point improvement in the freedom score in all the cases where there was no opposition violence. [Table 4b, Graph 4a] In all, the data showed there is more than a three (66 percent) to one chance (20 percent) chance that a country will attain high freedom post-transition where the opposition does not employ violent force. [Table 4]

We also wanted to test whether the results for freedom are better if the opposition does not itself use violence in cases of significant or high state violence and instead employs disciplined nonviolent civic resistance. Thus we looked at all the cases of transitions preceded by high or significant levels of violence. Of 32 countries where transitions were preceded by significant or high levels of violence, 20 cases were characterized by violent force emanating from both the state and segments of the opposition. Of these, pre-transition 8 were Partly Free and 12 were Not Free. Today, 4 (20 percent) are Free, 12 (60 percent) are Partly Free and 4 (20 percent) are Not Free. By contrast, we found 12 cases where significant or high levels of violence were mainly generated by the state (but where the opposition was nonviolent), pre-transition, 5 were Partly Free and 7 were Not Free. Years after the political opening, 7 (58 percent) are Free and 5 (42 percent) are Partly Free, while none are Not Free. [Table 3, Graphs 3a and 3b]

In the end, our data suggests that recourse to violent conflict in resisting oppression is significantly less likely to produce sustainable freedom, in contrast to nonviolent opposition, which even in the face of state repression, is far more likely to yield a democratic outcome.

A more detailed, numerical look at the data on transitions preceded by high or significant levels of violence confirms the conclusion that the opposition’s resort to violence

reduces the chances for high levels of freedom. In 20 transitions, both the state and parts of the opposition used violent force. The mean numerical freedom rating in these settings before the transition was 5.50. After the transition, it was 3.98, representing an improvement of 1.52 points on the 1-to-7 freedom scale. In only four (twenty percent) of these cases were strong civic coalitions influencing the direction of events as authoritarian systems fell. [Table 3a]

By contrast, in the 12 settings with high or significant violence by the state when the opposition refrained from itself taking up violent force, the mean pre-transition freedom score was 5.25. Today, post-transition, their average freedom rating is 2.63 points, an improvement of 2.62 points*. [Table 3b] Importantly, strong nonviolent civic coalitions were present in 83 percent of these settings (in 10 of 12 cases).

Our data therefore suggests that the activity of strong nonviolent coalitions reduces the appeal of opposition violence and at the same time leads to more positive outcomes for freedom.

There is also significant positive synergy from a combination of factors. There were 18 countries where a nonviolent or mostly nonviolent transition was accompanied by nonviolent resistance led by strong, cohesive civic coalitions. In the year before the transition, no countries had been rated Free, 9 were Partly Free, and 9 were Not Free. But after the transition, 17 (94 percent) of these countries were Free, 1 was Partly Free, and none were Not Free. Transition countries in which these two criteria were present in the two-year period before the political opening saw their freedom score rise from a pre-transition average of 5.47 to 1.53 today, a dramatically positive gain of 3.94 points on a 7-point scale. [Table 5]

* The data also makes it clear that the factor of violence before the transition was less significant in determining the success or failure of a transition to freedom than was the factor of whether the opposition forces themselves engaged in significant violence.

This study, therefore, suggests that the choice of strategies employed by the opposition in developing resistance to oppression is of fundamental importance to the outcome for freedom. This, in turn, suggests that both the international community and the leaders of opposition movements should pay close attention to these findings.

The Need For A Paradigm Shift

Given the significance of the civic factor in dozens of recent transitions from dictatorship, it is surprising how small a proportion of international donor assistance is targeted to this sector. Americans have been leaders in providing such democracy assistance, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy, and through major private donors such as the Open Society Institute and a small group of other private charitable foundations. Some European governments—in particular those of Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and Germany—have furnished timely support for independent civic groups. A high proportion of this assistance is provided through such independent groups as the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the U.K.'s Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and Germany's political party foundations, the Stiftungen.

However, support aimed at change that is driven by civic forces represents only a small proportion of international development aid that is directed at democracy assistance. Consider the funds allocated by USAID for democracy assistance: while a third of such assistance is formally allocated to civil society programs, most of these programs are not targeted explicitly at political-reform-oriented NGOs. Nor does such aid make a priority of assisting groups that are focused on nonviolent civic resistance or on activist youth groups that have been an important front line of civic resistance struggles.

Additionally, support for the advocacy work of NGOs has fallen somewhat out of favor among donors providing democracy assistance, and funding

that encourages the building of nationwide civic coalitions to pressure for concrete change is relatively scarce. The overwhelming proportion of civil society funding supports what is called general capacity building—training and technical assistance—and is rarely matched with direct grants and the transfer of specific strategic and tactical knowledge and skills that are so essential to sustaining the infrastructure of emerging civic groups and nonviolent civic movements, especially in their early stages of development.

Moreover, most political party strengthening programs are typically carried out in complete isolation from the civil society programs. Yet, most successful civic transitions come from the joining of forces and complementary strategies that connect democratic political groups and the broader civil society.

Once a political opening has occurred and a transition to democracy is underway, it is essential for donors to continue support for pro-democracy civic groups as a means of ensuring that there is civic pressure on the new authorities to continue down the path of liberalization and reform.

There is an urgent need for the international democratic community to understand better the importance of indigenous civic resistance directed at challenging authoritarian rule and spurring democratization and to implement a paradigm shift in its priorities in order to promote and strengthen such movements with new resources and new aid initiatives. It is also important for policymakers to recognize that in most cases, such investments in civic life are minimal—a matter of millions of dollars or less. Support for civic movements is far less expensive than major military expenditures and far less costly than the normal bill for large development programs. Yet given the correlations between open, transparent, democratic societies and peace, as well as sustainable development, there is an urgent need for greater international commitment to funding this sector, especially in closed societies and fragile new democracies.

With the promotion of freedom and democracy now a major declared objective for the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Canada, and other democracies, there is a need for ongoing study of the phenomenon of political transitions in general and democratic transitions specifically. We hope this study is only the first step in a more comprehensive effort to address the many factors that contribute to lasting democratic change rooted in respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The world is moving toward greater respect for political rights and civil liberties. Authoritarian rule, political despotism, rampant state criminality and corruption, and the systematic abuse of minorities are under challenge. Yet while there has been momentum in favor of freedom, further such progress is far from guaranteed. If the globe's growing community of democracies does not fully understand and respond intelligently with specific initiatives that reinforce and promote change through the strategic use of nonviolent civic action, authoritarian rule will persist in many settings.

Policy Implications

This study of transitions is rife with specific policy implications for democratic movements and the international donor community. As can be seen from the findings, the

study makes clear that how a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform.

As is known, many transitions from authoritarian rule do not lead to freedom. When tyrannies or closed systems fall, democracy is far from the only outcome. Among the 67 countries we examined, pre-transition none were Free, 31 were Partly Free, and 36 were Not Free. Today 35 are Free, 23 are Partly Free, and 9 are Not Free. The opportunity for freedom after a political opening represented by the fall of an authoritarian is by itself not a guarantee of an optimal outcome for freedom in the long term. Therefore, it is essential that indigenous democratic activists and policymakers in democratic states understand more clearly what are the most productive and cost-effective ways to increase the chances for successful democratic transitions.

Transitions are largely indigenous phenomena. But while on the surface they often appear to be entirely spontaneous, closer examination shows such transitions frequently are the consequence of the cumulative effects of nonviolent strategies and cohesive civic coalitions. This means the democratic community of nations can devise policies and take steps that promote the factors most conducive to successful transitions to freedom. We will discuss these factors and their policy implications in greater detail below.

Invest in Civic Life

According to this study, one way to increase the odds for successful transitions to freedom is to invest in the creation of dynamic civic life. Such support is most effectively rendered in the following sequence: general assistance for civil society forces; targeted assistance focused on education and training in civic nonviolent resistance; and assistance for cohesive civic coalitions through which such resistance is expressed. This means government and donor policy should direct increased resources to this important factor in effective political change and provide significant resources and knowledge to NGOs, civil society groups, and the fostering of



broad-based indigenous coalitions.

To support the development of civic life, governments, regional bodies, and global institutions also should exert diplomatic and other pressures on states to create political space and toleration for the activity of civil society as a key precondition for the formation of civic movements.

Specifically, government and private support should be offered to activist student organizations, anti-corruption groups, election monitoring and voter education organizations, independent media, political party training structures, trade unions and worker organizations, women's groups, and think tanks.

Encourage the Creation of Broad-Based Coalitions

While the development of a broad array of civic, reform-oriented organizations is essential for the success of most transitions, the study shows that such developments also should be matched by ef-

forts to establish a broad-based civic coalition focused on nonviolent resistance. There are many reasons why such umbrella civic coalitions are important in the outcomes for freedom. First, the organization, training, and operation of a diverse and voluntary civic coalition require the shaping of consensus through internal democratic practices. Second, the emergence of such coalitions boosts enthusiasm among ordinary citizens and activists by giving them a sense of momentum and consolidation. This in turn increases the number of volunteers, participants, and activists who are mobilized for nonviolent resistance efforts. Third, when such movements achieve a mass scale, they effectively prepare millions of citizens for political and civic activity, which then makes powerholders accountable after a democratic change occurs. Fourth, when coalitions are broad based and incorporate a diverse array of societal and political interests, they gain increased legitimacy enabling them to act as credible representatives of the broader interests of the society or the nation.

Internally, broad-based civic coalitions are environments for compromise, common ground, and self-discipline. As separate groupings learn to work with others who hold different political beliefs, they create a basis for the tolerant give-and-take that is a crucial component of democracy. At the same time, mass-based civic movements become an important school for the preparation of future civic leaders, politicians, opinion makers, and government leaders in the post-transition period. They become a mechanism for the emergence of a new leadership cohort, often creating a talent pool that can sustain the transition toward freedom.

In short, broad-based democracy coalitions can imbue leaders and activists with the principles and experience that make for successful democratic governance.

Such coalitions are also more likely to result in a negotiated transition based on co-opting segments of the powerholding elite that recognize the need for reform. This is because the emergence of a cohesive and powerful opposition force capable of taking power creates rifts and divisions among authoritarian powerholders. Internal divisions among powerholders help separate the most repressive segments of the ruling elite from open-minded segments, whose withdrawal of support for the government or their unwillingness to use force against a nonviolent mass opposition are among the critical processes in many successful democratic transitions.

Internal as well as external donors should encourage the leaders of a varied array of democratic groups to find ways of coalescing into broad-based coalitions for democratic change. Official and nongovernmental outreach to democratic movements should emphasize the need for such cooperation if a peaceful transition to democracy is to be achieved. Naturally, it is up to the civic forces themselves to decide what alliances they should form, but the international democratic community should encourage opposition reformers to focus on broad-based coalition building and should encourage such steps with increased donor support and technical assistance. A component of such assistance should be programs that promote exchanges among civic activists in countries where successful transitions to freedom have occurred and their counterparts in closed societies.

As the data and narratives show, a key opportunity for broad-based umbrella coalitions to reach critical mass is provided by major national elections and referenda. This means that pressure on states to sustain electoral processes should remain a high prior-

ity of democratic governments and donors. While critics frequently point to sham elections and pseudo-democracy, it is very often precisely such seemingly illegitimate processes that spur mass-based challenges to authoritarian rule and open the door to real liberalization. Among such examples are Kyrgyzstan in early 2005, Ukraine in 2004, and Georgia in 2003 (all of which occurred too recently for their durable effects to be properly assessed and included in this survey); the 1986 presidential election in the Philippines; Chile's 1988 referendum on the presidency of Augusto Pinochet; Nicaragua's election of 1990; the 2000 presidential election in Serbia and Montenegro (formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); and Peru's tainted election of 2000. In all these cases, a vote became the catalyst for the successful application of civic mobilization and resistance strategies.

Broad-based civic movements usually fragment after a transition from authoritarianism. However, their fragmentation often results in the creation and regeneration of a host of active civic groups, media, and other mechanisms for non-state monitoring of government activities and for public pressure in support of democracy, human rights, anti-corruption measures, educational reform, and social change. A lively civic sector in the post-transition period can become an important force for transparency and accountability among the new government powerholders. It creates pressure groups that can push the new democratically-accountable leadership to hold to its pre-transition reform commitments.

Transfer Knowledge On Strategies and Tactics of Nonviolent Civic Resistance

Change—and the capacity to force change in any country—depends on internal factors and on internal changes in public opinion. But opposition forces can be helped in more effectively achieving their aims if they are assisted in thinking strategically about how to push change through nonviolent means. The existence of a growing civic infrastructure of well-trained activist groups and their coalescing into broad-based coalitions also needs to be coupled with knowledge on how to devise effective strategies of nonviolent resistance to authoritarian power.

This means that as indigenous civic movements are taking shape, they should be able to access expertise on a broad range of successful examples of broad-based civic resistance campaigns.

There should be a capacity to rapidly respond for requests for expertise and training when indigenous movements are ready for such assistance. A focal point of training and assistance should be how to organize and sequence nonviolent protests and mass demonstrations; strikes and other forms of industrial action; boycotts that exert domestic economic pressure on regimes and their financial backers; and nonviolent civil disobedience. They also should be given advice on more effective dissemination of information through media (including the Internet, telephone text messaging, etc.) that remain largely outside the control of authoritarian states.

Expand Space for Nonviolent Action Through Targeted Sanctions

Another crucial way of assisting democratic transitions is to work to constrain insurrectionist and state violence and to expand the political space for nonviolent civic action. This means that in the cases of civil wars, governments and international organizations should seek solutions that lead to an end to hostilities and to internationally supervised or monitored elections. Democracies also should engage in preventive diplomacy to avert violence and support policies that prevent or limit the spread of violence in its earliest stages.

International democratic donor support also should support nonviolent movements that can serve in repressive settings as an effective alternative to violence and to the appeal of groups that espouse violence. Besieged populations that suffer from ethnic, sectarian, or political violence are often sympathetic to the demagogic appeal of authoritarian leaders who use the danger of conflict as a justification for their own repressive rule.

Efforts to restore personal security in extremely violent environments in countries that have suffered from war or civil war, therefore, can contribute in the long term to the emergence of civic

coalitions for democratic change. Moreover, an environment in which civic organizing and nonviolent action are a viable option helps discredit the claims by violent extremists that they offer the only avenue for change.

A key mechanism in helping to constrain violence and create space for civic action is the willingness of the international democratic community to employ targeted sanctions against the economic interests of government officials who contemplate or use violent force to suppress nonviolent civic resistance. Such threats of sanctions can help constrain and discourage authoritarian states from resorting to the use of force by raising the costs of the use of this option. In this way, targeted sanctions and their threatened imposition can create greater space for nonviolent civic resistance movements.

As importantly, the data suggests that the interests of freedom are best furthered when the opposition resists state violence through nonviolent mass resistance. The study also indicates that the appeal of violent responses to the state is diminished when a strong and cohesive nonviolent coalition is a major presence in the period leading up to the political opening. This, in turn, reemphasizes the need to direct resources and technical assistance toward support for such civic movements.

Provide Enhanced Resources for Independent Media and Communications

Authoritarian leaders lack democratic legitimacy, and this lack of legitimacy needs to be challenged by democratic civic forces. But because repressive governments limit or control media and communications, pro-democracy activists must develop independent outlets of communication in order to stake their claim to represent the legitimate aspirations of the people. Invaluable in this effort are the Internet; independent newspapers and newsletters; unauthorized or external broadcast facilities; and cell phones, satellite phones, and text-messaging devices.

Independent communications and media are essential in mobilizing indigenous support for nonviolent resistance against a ruling elite. They also are crucial in helping opposition groups reach out to potential allies among disaffected members of the ruling elite, including segments of the defense and security services. Communications and alternative media can help civic opposition movements in making the case that they offer a viable alternative to illegitimate authoritarian rule. In this way they can erode support for authoritarians among their crucial pillars of power.

De-legitimizing an authoritarian ruler is as important to the success of a nonviolent civic movement as the movement's effort to establish itself as the legitimate voice of public aspirations. In many recent transitions, the corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and the outright criminality of authoritarian elites have been key factors in deepening public alienation and encouraging ideologically diverse groups to coalesce into a unified opposition. Independent media that report on state corruption and expose abuses of power are critical nonviolent tactics in facilitating this process.

Democracy assistance from the international community should therefore substantially increase resources for alternative media and independent communications that can carry the message of pro-democratic civil society and nonviolent resistance groups within closed and authoritarian societies.

Concluding Observations

This study is a first look at how freedom is won. It does not offer a panacea for the world's ills. Nor does it suggest a rigid formula for deposing tyrannies and replacing them with democracies. It only examines a number of factors that contribute to the success and failure of transitions to democracy. The study does not, for example, examine all the factors that help create an environment conducive to the emergence of cooperative civic coalitions. Nor does it examine correlations of its findings with levels of income, levels of education, or levels of middle class development, all of which are understood to be important factors in contributing to the success or failure of democratic reform. This study also did not look at how authoritarian systems or totalitarian systems successfully retain their power, nor did the study examine failed efforts by opposition movements to force a transition from authoritarian rule. It is our hope that this study will also promote research into all these other dimensions of freedom and its suppression.

It is essential to the advancement of democracy that the concrete mechanisms by which freedom advances are better understood and more widely discussed by the policymaking and analytic communities. Yet while there is no fixed blueprint for the replacement of tyranny with democracy, the initial findings of this study suggest some important trends that in many cases can be applied in a range of difficult authoritarian settings.

It is with this purpose that Freedom House and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict will work to promote and disseminate its findings.

Adrian Karatnycky is counselor and senior scholar at Freedom House. Peter Ackerman is chairman of the board trustees of Freedom House and chairman of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

Notes

"How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy" is a study based on research conducted by Freedom House. Data and findings were reviewed and evaluated by a panel of independent academic authorities. The project was also supported by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

Statistical Summary

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule



Tables And Charts

Table 1: Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions

Table 1a) Strong: 32 Transitions (48%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR**
Pre-Transition	0	17 (53%)	15 (47%)	5.33
FIW* 2005	24 (75%)	8 (25%)	0	2.09
	Change in CAR			3.24

* FIW: Freedom in the World
 ** CAR: "Combined Average Rating" (average of FIW Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores.

The scores are based on a 1-7 scale: 1 represents the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest.)


Table 1b) Moderate: 18 Transitions (27%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	9 (50%)	9 (50%)	5.11
FIW 2005	8 (44%)	7 (39%)	3 (17%)	3.39
	Change in CAR			1.72

Table 1c) Weak/Absent: 17 Transitions (25%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	5 (29%)	12 (71%)	5.47
FIW 2005	3 (18%)	8 (47%)	6 (35%)	4.15
	Change in CAR			1.32

Graph 1a: The Stronger a Nonviolent Civic Coalition, the Larger the Gains for Freedom



Graph 1b: The Presence of Strong Civic Coalitions Improves Chances for Freedom




Table 2: Forces Driving The Transition

Table 2a) Civic Forces: 18 Transitions (27%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	10 (56%)	8 (44%)	5.47
FIW 2005	10 (56%)	7 (39%)	1 (5%)	2.69
	Change in CAR			2.78

Table 2b) Mixed: Civic Forces/Powerholders: 32 Transitions (48%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	15 (47%)	17 (53%)	5.14
FIW 2005	22 (69%)	7 (22%)	3 (9%)	2.56
	Change in CAR			2.58


Table 2c) Powerholders: 14 Transitions (21%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	6 (43%)	8 (57%)	5.21
FIW 2005	2 (14%)	8 (57%)	4 (29%)	4.11
	Change in CAR			1.10

Table 2d) Outside Intervention: 3 Transitions (4%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	0	3 (100%)	6.50
FIW 2005	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	3.50
	Change in CAR			3.00

Graph 2a) Transitions with High Civic Involvement Lead to More Freedom Than Top-Down Transitions



Graph 2b) Civic Forces are Major Drivers of Transitions to Freedom




Table 3: The Sources Of Violence*

* Includes transitions with high violence or significant violence only


Table 3a) State And Opposition Violence: 20 Transitions (62.5%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	8 (40%)	12 (60%)	5.50
FIW 2005	4 (20%)	12 (60%)	4 (20%)	3.98
			Change in CAR	1.52

Table 3b) Only State Violence: 12 Transitions (37.5%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	6 (50%)	6 (50%)	5.25
FIW 2005	7 (58%)	5 (42%)	0	2.63
			Change in CAR	2.62

Graph 3a: State and Opposition Violence
Post Transition (FIW 2005) Freedom Status



Graph 3b: Only State Violence
Post Transition (FIW 2005) Freedom Status




Table 4: Freedom And Opposition Violence

Table 4a) Nonviolent/Mostly Nonviolent Opposition: 47 Transitions (70%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	23 (49%)	24 (51%)	5.22
FIW 2005	31 (66%)	11 (23%)	5 (11%)	2.53
	Change in CAR			2.69

Table 4b) Significantly/Highly Violent Opposition: 20 Transitions (30%)

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	8 (40%)	12 (60%)	5.50
FIW 2005	4 (20%)	12 (60%)	4 (20%)	3.98
	Change in CAR			1.52

Graph 4a: Gains for Freedom are Higher When the Opposition Refrains from Violence




Table 5: Synergy Effect

Strong Civic Forces, Nonviolent/Mostly Nonviolent

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Mean CAR
Pre-Transition	0	9 (50%)	9 (50%)	5.47
FIW 2005	17 (94%)	1 (6%)	0	1.53
	Change in CAR			3.94

Complete Data Set

Country	Pre-Transition Rating					FIW 2005				Strength of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions Coalitions	Forces Driving the Transition	Sources of Violence	Level of Violence
	Year	PR	CL	CAR	Status	PR	CL	CAR	Status				
Albania	1989	7	6	6.5	NF	3	3	3	PF	Moderate	Civic	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Argentina	1981	6	5	5.5	NF	2	2	2	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	State & Opposition	High Violence
Armenia	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	4	4	4	PF	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Azerbaijan	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	6	5	5.5	PF	Strong	Civic	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Bangladesh	1989	4	4	4	PF	4	4	4	PF	Strong	Civic	State	Significant Violence
Belarus	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	6	6	6	NF	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Benin	1989	7	7	7	NF	2	2	2	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Bolivia	1982	7	5	6	NF	3	3	3	PF	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State	High Violence
Bosnia-Herz.	1994	6	6	6	NF	4	3	3.5	PF	Weak/Absent	External Intervention	State & Opposition	High Violence
Brazil	1984	3	3	3	PF	2	3	2.5	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Bulgaria	1988	7	7	7	NF	1	2	1.5	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Cambodia	1990	7	7	7	NF	6	5	5.5	NF	Weak/Absent	External Intervention	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Cape Verde	1990	5	5	5	PF	1	1	1	F	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Chile	1987	6	5	5.5	PF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Croatia	1998	4	4	4	PF	2	2	2	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Czech Rep.	1987	7	6	6.5	NF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Nonviolent
El Salvador	1991	3	4	3.5	PF	2	3	2.5	F	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	High Violence
Estonia	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Ethiopia	1990	7	7	7	NF	5	5	5	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	High Violence
Gambia	2000	7	5	6	NF	4	4	4	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Ghana	1999	3	3	3	PF	2	3	2.5	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Greece	1973	7	5	6	NF	1	2	1.5	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Guatemala	1995	4	5	4.5	PF	4	4	4	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	High Violence
Guyana	1989	5	4	4.5	PF	2	2	2	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Hungary	1988	5	4	4.5	PF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Indonesia	1997	7	5	6	NF	3	4	3.5	PF	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State & Opposition	High Violence
Iran	1978	5	6	5.5	PF	6	6	6	NF	Moderate	Civic	State & Opposition	High Violence
Kazakhstan	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	6	5	5.5	NF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Kyrgyzstan	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	6	5	5.5	NF	Weak/Absent	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Latvia	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	1	2	1.5	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Lithuania	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	2	1	1.5	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State	Significant Violence
Macedonia	1989	5	4	4.5	PF	3	3	3	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Madagascar	1989	5	4	4.5	PF	3	3	3	PF	Strong	Civic	State	Significant Violence

Country	Pre-Transition Rating					FIW 2005				Strength of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Forces Driving the Transition	Sources of Violence	Level of Violence
	Year	PR	CL	CAR	Status	PR	CL	CAR	Status				
Malawi	1991	7	6	6.5	NF	4	4	4	PF	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State	Significant Violence
Mali	1990	6	5	5.5	NF	2	2	2	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State	Significant Violence
Mexico	1999	3	4	3.5	PF	2	2	2	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Moldova	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	3	4	3.5	PF	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Mongolia	1989	7	7	7	NF	2	2	2	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Mozambique	1991	6	4	5	NF	3	4	3.5	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Nepal	1989	4	5	4.5	PF	5	5	5	PF	Moderate	Civic	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Nicaragua	1989	5	5	5	PF	3	3	3	PF	Strong	Civic	State & Opposition	High Violence
Nigeria	1997	7	6	6.5	NF	4	4	4	PF	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	State	Significant Violence
Panama	1988	7	6	6.5	NF	1	2	1.5	F	Weak/Absent	External Intervention	State	High Violence
Paraguay	1988	6	6	6	NF	3	3	3	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Peru	1999	5	4	4.5	PF	2	3	2.5	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Philippines	1985	4	3	3.5	PF	2	2	2	F	Strong	Civic	State	Significant Violence
Poland	1988	5	5	5	PF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Portugal	1973	5	6	5.5	NF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Romania	1988	7	7	7	NF	3	2	2.5	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Russia	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	6	5	5.5	NF	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Senegal	1999	4	4	4	PF	2	3	2.5	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Serbia-Mont.	1999	5	5	5	PF	3	2	2.5	F	Strong	Civic	State	High Violence
Slovakia	1988	7	6	6.5	NF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Slovenia	1989	5	4	4.5	PF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
South Africa	1989	6	5	5.5	PF	1	2	1.5	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
South Korea	1986	4	5	4.5	PF	1	2	1.5	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State	Significant Violence
Spain	1974	5	5	5	PF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Taiwan	1991	5	5	5	PF	2	2	2	F	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Tajikistan	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	6	5	5.5	NF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Tanzania	1993	6	5	5.5	NF	4	3	3.5	PF	Moderate	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Thailand	1991	6	4	5	PF	2	3	2.5	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	State	Significant Violence
Turkey	1980	5	5	5	PF	3	3	3	PF	Moderate	Powerholders	State & Opposition	Significant Violence
Uganda	1984	5	4	4.5	PF	5	4	4.5	PF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	High Violence
Uruguay	1983	5	4	4.5	PF	1	1	1	F	Strong	Mixed C/PH	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Uzbekistan	1988	6	5	5.5	NF	7	6	6.5	NF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	none/negligible	Mostly Nonviolent
Zambia	1989	6	5	5.5	PF	4	4	4	PF	Strong	Civic	none/negligible	Nonviolent
Zimbabwe	1975	6	5	5.5	NF	7	6	6.5	NF	Weak/Absent	Powerholders	State & Opposition	High Violence

Reports

Country Reports



Albania

Transition Point 1990-91

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	7	6	NF
Rating (2004)	3	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Widespread student protests in December 1990 led to the rapid legalization of independent and opposition political parties. Massive miners' strikes in early 1991 led to strong opposition results in elections won by the ruling party. Outbreaks of minor violence in the country's capital and its north. After, a wave of strikes that culminated in a crippling general strike and resulted in a coalition government in which the opposition parties held the majority of seats.

Argentina

Transition Point 1982-83

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1981	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Following a 1976 military coup that removed Maria Isabela Peron from the presidency, the new regime began a campaign of severe repression against political opponents and alleged terrorists and sympathizers. The campaign, known as "el proceso," or the "dirty war," resulted in some 10,000 to 30,000 persons disappeared during the years 1976-83. The defeat of Argentina in the 1982 Falklands war further eroded support for the armed forces and led to an expansion of civic activism and protest. The year leading up to the return of civilian rule saw the reemergence of strong trade unions, more outspoken business associations, and active human rights and civic groups. These played an important role in the pressure toward the restoration of electoral politics, resulting in the election of President Raul Alfonsin in December 1983 and the reestablishment of democratic institutions.

Armenia

Transition Point 1989-91

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Newly-independent Armenia's transition occurred at the time of an emerging conflict that eventually erupted into a fully-fledged war with Azerbaijan over the disputed neighboring region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Anti-Armenian violence in Azerbaijan forced the migration of tens of thousands of Armenians and contributed to a tense environment inside Armenia itself. A large civic movement calling for reunification with predominantly-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh had been a catalyst for a protest and civic movement in Soviet Armenia in the late 1980s. This widespread civic popular front also took on demands of state independence for Armenia, which became an independent state in late 1991 at the time of the USSR's disintegration. The nonviolent orientation of the popular front was challenged by more militant political movements that advocated the use of force to claim Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia.

Azerbaijan

Transition Point 1989-91

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	5	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Newly-independent Azerbaijan's transition occurred at a time of an emerging conflict that eventually erupted into a fully-fledged war with Armenia over the disputed neighboring region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Anti-Azeri violence in Nagorno-Karabakh erupted, forcing the migration of tens of thousands of Azeris to Baku. Anti-Armenian violence contributed to Armenian refugee flows from Baku and other localities. A large civic movement, the Azerbaijani Popular Front, emerged from mass civic protests that at times involved hundreds of thousands of marchers. The large and varied civic opposition pressed for state independence, which initially was opposed by the discredited local Communist elite. The nonviolent popular front operated in an environment in which there were rival militant and violent groups.

Bangladesh

Transition Point	1990-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1984	4	4	PF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

In Bangladesh, the path to restored democracy unfolded in late 1990 when President Lt. General Hossain Mohammad Ershad, who seized power in a 1982 military coup, abruptly resigned on December 6th after weeks of escalating civilian protests against authoritarian rule. The movement against the Ershad government became more prominent in 1987, when the influential Awami League and the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party demanded the president's resignation and free elections. Mass demonstrations, accompanied by some violence, were suppressed after Ershad proclaimed a state of emergency. In early October 1990, the civic movement to oust Ershad was revived as people from all spheres of life began to defy the state-imposed curfew and organize mass strikes and demonstrations, leading to Ershad's resignation. Following Ershad's downfall, the transitional government quickly established democratic institutions. Free elections with candidates from over 100 parties were held in February 1991. Khaleda Zia was named Bangladesh's first female prime minister, and within months, the country adopted a parliamentary system, ending sixteen years of presidential rule.

Belarus

Transition Point	1989-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	6	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

A broad-based, nonviolent civic movement, led by the Belarus Popular Front, emerged in the late 1980s and became a coalition pressing for autonomy and democratic rights. The front united cultural groups, workers associations, and political movements, but its influence was largely confined to major cities. Upon the collapse of the August 1991 coup in the USSR, the country's parliamentary chairman, Stanislau Shushkevich, who had been elected in 1990 with broad civic support, led the rapid process toward state independence.

Benin

Transition Point	1990-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	7	7	NF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

After 17 years of rule by Marxist-Leninist dictator Mathieu Kerekou, an economic crisis and massive social unrest spurred a civic movement consisting of students, teachers, university faculty, and union leaders to call an eventually paralyzing nationwide strike in January 1989. As suppression efforts failed and French political and economic pressure increased, Kerekou abolished Marxist-Leninism as the state ideology, legalized opposition parties, and called for the holding of a National Conference in February 1990. Delegates to the Conference included leaders from opposition political parties, unions, universities, religious associations, the army, and women's groups. Despite Kerekou's resistance, the Conference successfully declared itself sovereign, drafted a new, democratic constitution, and organized the holding of national, competitive, multiparty elections the following year.

Bolivia

Transition Point	1982		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1981	7	5	NF
Rating (2004)	3	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Bolivia left behind its long legacy of mostly military rule after a particularly brutal and corrupt military government was brought down by civic protests and a paralyzing general strike in 1982. General Luis Garcia Meza led a bloody coup in 1980, retaining the military's grip on power, which it had held all but uninterrupted since 1964. His repressive, corrupt and internationally isolated government dispirited many in the military's ranks, and amidst a severe economic crisis that triggered mass protests and a crippling general strike in 1982, the military's high command decided to return to the barracks. The Congress was reconvened and selected as the new president Hernan Siles Zuazo, who had won a plurality of votes in the annulled 1980 elections. He assumed the office on October 10, 1982.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Transition Point 1995

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1994	6	6	NF
Rating (2004)	4	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	External Intervention (Military)
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Bosnia's political transition began in 1995 after the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia signed the U.S.-brokered Dayton Accords, bringing an end to almost four years of brutal war. The complex agreement established a constitutional framework for the creation of a federative state, incorporating two republics, free and fair elections, and the repatriation of refugees. In April 1992, after Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, Bosnia was recognized as an independent state. Ethnic war soon ensued, claiming the lives of over two hundred thousand people and making refugees of over half of the Bosnian population. Nationalist political parties gained control over their respective ethnic groups and established separate governing institutions: the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) controlled Republika Srpska, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) ruled over central and northwestern Bosnia, and the Croat Democratic Party (HDZ) dominated western Herzegovina. In mid-1995, after the Serb military had suffered major defeats by internationally-aided Croatian and Bosniak forces, the Serb leadership agreed to negotiate. The international community pressured the Bosniaks and Croats to accept the terms of the Dayton Accords by threatening to withdraw military aid. It also warned of further military intervention against the Serbs if the Serbian leadership refused to cooperate. Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia has had several fairly free federal, regional, and local elections. These votes, however, continue to be dominated by nationalist parties that promote ethnic insecurities and separatism.

Brazil

Transition Point 1984-5

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1983	3	3	PF
Rating (2004)	2	3	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The military dictatorship's movement toward a political opening began in the early 1980s amid public calls for an end to military rule. In 1983, millions of citizens took to the streets in the major cities demanding a direct vote in the next presidential election. The official opposition, the Brazilian Democratic Movement, had recently gained seats in the Congress, but not enough to change the existing law from an indirect, electoral-college vote to a direct vote. The disorganized military leadership failed to forcefully back a candidate in the January 1985 presidential election, leaving an opening for opposition members of Congress to rally behind and elect a civilian candidate, the first since the military had taken power more than twenty years earlier.

Bulgaria

Transition Point 1989

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	7	7	NF
Rating (2004)	1	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

In 1989, environmental and labor movements took the lead in the initial phases of an emerging popular civic coalition (the United Democratic Front) that pressed the country's hardline communist leadership to abandon its monopoly on power. Protests and strikes in 1989 led to multiparty elections in mid-1990 that resulted in a narrow victory by the ruling ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party. However, ongoing political scandals and civic pressure led to the resignation of the Socialist president and the election by parliament of an opposition head of state.

Cambodia

Transition Point 1991-93

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1990	7	7	NF
Rating (2004)	6	5	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	External Intervention (Military)
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

In October 1991, after the leaders of four rival groupings—Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge’s Sonn San, Prime Minister Hun Sen, and Khieu Samphan—and representatives of eighteen other countries signed a peace treaty in Paris, Cambodia began its political transition. The agreement called for a new constitution to be drafted by a freely elected national assembly, for the U.N. Transitional Authority (UNTAC) to run five key ministries in advance of national elections, and for UNTAC to place over 20,000 troops in temporary cantons. In May 1993, Cambodians elected a new government in the country’s first multiparty voting since a 1972 presidential election. Despite some irregularities, security issues, and the U.N.’s inability to fully provide a neutral political environment, the vote was the freest in the country’s history. A new constitution was adopted on September 21, creating a constitutional monarchy in which the king “reigns but does not rule,” has the power to make governmental appointments after consultation with ministers, and can declare a state of emergency if the prime minister and cabinet agree. In 1997, however, the military organized a “soft coup,” and former Khmer Rouge cadre Hun Sen regained unchallenged power.

Cape Verde

Transition Point

1991

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1990	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Sixteen years of post-independence Marxist, one-party rule was brought to an end in a free, fair, and nonviolent election in 1991. Internal and (primarily) external pressures convinced the leaders of the Africa Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) to amend the constitution in 1990 to allow for multiparty political competition and a directly-elected president and National Assembly. Elections in January 1991 saw the opposition coalition Movement for Democracy (MPD) win a landslide victory. Pre-election negotiations between the PAICV and the MPD had ensured a free and fair election and a smooth transition of power.

Chile

Transition Point

1988

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1987	6	5	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

After a 15-year period of military rule, a growing civic protest movement won a convincing victory in a 1988 referendum on ending the military dictatorship. The years 1985-88, in particular, witnessed a decline in violent repression, the rise of significant public demonstrations, and the reemergence of civic organizations, trade unions, and political parties. A broad coalition movement—the National Accord for a Full Transition to Democracy—was the principal force that used nonviolent means to press for gradual democratization and liberalization, including an end to restrictions on civil liberties and free and open elections. Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin assumed the office of the presidency after emerging victorious in open elections held in December 1989.

Croatia

Transition Point

1999

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1998	4	4	PF
Rating (2004)	1	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Croatia made a transition to multiparty democratic rule in December 1999, following the death of Franjo Tudjman, the leader of Croatia’s independence movement. After his ascent to power in 1990, Tudjman purged all members of the opposition from state institutions and expressed no interest in creating a transparent electoral system. When hostilities ended in 1995, small pockets of opposition began to gain strength while Tudjman’s party, the Croatian Democratic Unity (HDZ), found that its capacity to successfully use ethnic nationalism and scare tactics were weakening. As a result, early 2000 saw the surprising defeat of the HDZ in free and open parliamentary and presidential elections.

Most state media bias in favor of the HDZ was balanced by the pro-change sentiment expressed by private media and civil society groups, particularly youth and women’s organizations. The new government headed by President Stipe Mesic pushed for the democratization of the electoral system, protection of human rights, and freedom of the press.

Czech Republic

Transition Point	1988		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1987	7	6	NF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The transition that led to the collapse of one-party Communist rule and to the emergence in 1992 of separate Czech and Slovak states, in what was termed a "velvet divorce," was rooted in the nonviolent civic protests of November 1989. The massive protests that involved as many as half a million citizens in the streets of Prague culminated in a nationwide general strike on November 28, 1989. The nationwide work stoppages throughout the Czech and Slovak regions of the then-unified state of Czechoslovakia led to the announcement by the Communist authorities that they would end their monopoly on power. By the end of the year, roundtable talks paved the way to presidential and parliamentary elections in 1990, which resulted in the election of opposition democratic reform politicians. In the Czech regions, the Civic Forum emerged as a cohesive democratic popular front, uniting workers, students, and the intelligentsia.

El Salvador

Transition Point	1992-94		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1991	3	4	PF
Rating (2004)	2	3	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Civil war tore El Salvador apart during the 1980s, killing almost 80,000 people, as a series of civilian, military-backed governments fought to a stalemate the leftist, insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The nationalist ARENA party came to power in 1989 in elections that, like all the others that decade, excluded leftist parties. ARENA was eager to end the war so as to attract foreign investment, while the FMLN, coming to terms with its inability to topple the government, was also interested in a settlement. As the Cold War wound down, the two sides, with the help of international mediators, signed peace accords in early 1992 that provided for free and competitive elections and the removal of the military from the political sphere. The incumbent ARENA party candidate for president handily defeated the FMLN-led opposition candidate in 1994, marking the first election in which leftist parties were allowed to participate since the start of the civil war.

Estonia

Transition Point	1991		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	4	5	NF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

A nonviolent, pro-independence movement, the Estonian Popular Front, emerged during the period of Soviet liberalization known as glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reform). The Congress of Estonia, a democratically-elected though informal body, served as a parallel people's assembly. The Congress represented within it a broad array of civic groups and served as an alternative to established authority. Demonstrations led by the Popular Front, and later the Congress, were supported by hundreds of thousands of protestors throughout the late 1980s until independence was proclaimed in the aftermath of an aborted coup by Soviet hardliners in August 1991.

Ethiopia

Transition Point	1991		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1990	7	7	NF
Rating (2004)	5	5	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Drought, famine, and insurrections in Tigray and Eritrea contributed to the May 1991 overthrow of the government of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Derg council of military leaders by forces of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF, which was led by Tigrains and included other ethnically-based opposition groups, formed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and others. The TGE consisted of a 87-member Council of Representatives and a national charter which served as an interim constitution. President Meles Zanawi promised to establish a multiparty democracy in Ethiopia. Elections to a constituent assembly took place in June 1994, and the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was adopted in December. National and regional legislative elections were held in May and June of 1995. The elections were boycotted by the main opposition parties and resulted in a landslide victory for the EPRDF. International observers concluded that opposition parties could have participated in the elections if they had opted to do so.

Gambia

Transition Point	2001		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 2000	7	5	NF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

The Gambia made a transition from military to civilian rule with a somewhat competitive multiparty election in October 2001. Early in 2001, former coup leader Yahya Jammeh had repealed the repressive Decree 89, which had banned opposition parties and prohibited any former ministers from participating in political activity or taking up a government post until 2024. The opposition was given free airtime on state-controlled radio and television during the campaign. While the Independent Electoral Commission was under some pressure by the ruling party, it generally operated freely. However, after Jammeh won the poll convincingly, allegations of electoral fraud and the detention of opposition supporters, journalists, and human rights workers tainted the result.

Ghana

Transition Point	2000		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1994	3	3	PF
Rating (2004)	2	3	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Presidential elections in December 2000 ended Ghana's long transition from one-party dictatorship to multiparty democracy. Having attained power in a military, and later a one-party, dictatorship, Ghanaian leader Jerry Rawlings responded to popular and international pressure by lessening political restrictions and adopting a multiparty constitution in the early 1990s. Rawlings lifted a ban on opposition parties only a few months before the 1992 elections, leading to a boycott. Elections in 1996 were fairer and saw a strong showing for the opposition, though the process was largely flawed. Nevertheless, Rawlings abided by the constitution's two-time presidential term limit, and his handpicked successor, John Atta Mills, was defeated by opposition leader John Kufuor in the December 2000 poll. Six opposition parties participated in these elections, deemed generally free and fair by international observers.

Greece

Transition Point	1974		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1973	7	5	NF
Rating (2004)	1	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The collapse of Greece's military dictatorship in 1974 opened the way for a swift transition to parliamentary democracy. The military junta, which ruled from 1967 to 1974, never gained legitimacy with large sections of the Greek public. Efforts to liberalize the regime in 1973 were met with large student demonstrations that called for systemic changes. Hardliners within the armed forces initiated an internal coup after the junta brutally suppressed the demonstrations on November 17, 1973. This occurred against the backdrop of a crisis with Turkey over Cyprus that peaked with Turkey's invasion of the island on July 20, 1974. The Greek regime, lacking support at home and abroad, was unable to retaliate and promptly collapsed. A moderate, civilian prime minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, was brought in several days later to guide a transition to democracy, which included parliamentary elections in November 1974 that returned him to office for a proper term and the promulgation of a new constitution in June 1975.

Guatemala

Transition Point	1996		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1995	4	5	PF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

A brutal and bloody civil war pitting Guatemala's military regime against the Leninist guerillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) produced no clear victor. By 1986, a new constitution had been drafted and a civilian president was elected partly on a pledge to end the political violence. In 1987, Guatemala, along with four other Central American nations, signed the Esquipulas Peace Accords that committed each country with an internal armed conflict to start a peace-making process. For its part, the URNG indicated its desire for peace by signing the Oslo Accord in 1990 that facilitated talks with Guatemalan civil society groups, applying pressure on the government to open a direct dialogue with the rebels. Contentious negotiations between the government and the URNG, mediated by the UN and five nations that constituted the "friends of Guatemala," resulted in a series of agreements on democratization, human rights, resettlement of displaced persons, historical clarification, and indigenous rights, culminating in the signing of peace accords that ended the 36-year internal conflict in December 1996. Despite the signing of interim accords and the presence since November 1994 of a United Nations mission dedicated to monitoring human rights, political violence remained high through 1995, though it waned in 1996 as the two sides moved toward a final agreement. Several factors combined to produce the peace deal, including international pressure to end Central America's last remaining armed conflict, the collapse of communism and end to the Cold War, the right-wing government's impatience for the international aid and investment that would accompany a peace agreement, and the URNG's desire to enter legal politics.

Guyana

Transition Point

1990-92

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1994	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

In the summer of 1990, the Guyanese Action for Reform and Democracy, a civic movement composed of religious groups, labor unions, and media and business groups, staged weekly rallies that attracted thousands calling for electoral reforms. At the same time, the ruling People's National Congress (PNC) began to feel pressure from Washington, which had begun to tie economic assistance—which the PNC needed to continue implementing an economic liberalization program—to political reform. Elections scheduled for 1991 were rescheduled for the following year after the Carter Center and other election monitoring groups threatened to abstain from observing the elections on account of a flawed voter list. Free and fair elections in 1992 saw the opposition coalition defeat the ruling party for the first time.

Hungary

Transition Point

1989-1990

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The emergence of independent civic groups and labor unions, reinforced by regional democratic ferment, glasnost, and perestroika, as well as fragmentation between reformers and hardliners in the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party, led first to the ouster of a conservative party leader and then to roundtable talks with civic opposition groups in late 1988. In 1990, civic ferment and pressure generated by a nationwide petition movement in favor of direct elections led to the collapse of the ruling order and its replacement with a multiparty democracy.

Indonesia

Transition Point

1998-99

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1997	7	5	NF
Rating (2004)	3	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The political transition in Indonesia began in May 1998 after General Suharto was forced to resign, following months of antigovernment protests. In the year prior to these protests, Indonesia found itself in the midst of a regional financial crisis that contributed to the devaluation of their currency, which sent food prices soaring and caused millions to lose their jobs. The widespread crisis motivated pro-democracy student groups to align with religious organizations in rallying against the ruling regime. The shooting of unarmed students by Suharto's security forces provoked the largest riots in Indonesian history—in which thousands of buildings were burned—and Suharto's eventual resignation. Vice President B.J. Habibie, a long-time Suharto loyalist, became president and quickly announced plans to hold democratic elections, to be held within a year. In June 1999, Indonesia held its first free parliamentary elections, in which the opposition party, the PDI-P, won the most public support. The military played a key facilitating role in supporting this negotiated agreement.

Iran

Transition Point	1979		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1978	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	6	6	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence	
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition	
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic	
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate	

Narrative

Radical revolutionaries inspired by exiled Islamic cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and moderate nonviolent democratic civic opposition overthrew the monarchical government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979. The shah's attempts to "westernize" Iran in the 1960s and 1970s bred clerical and civic resistance. In response, the Shah utilized his feared security forces, SAVAK, to suppress dissent. In 1978, anti-government demonstrations broke out in Iran's major cities. In September 1978, SAVAK forces fired on a large group of protestors, killing hundreds and wounding thousands. In December, thousands of rioters and demonstrators took to the streets of Tehran, destroying symbols of "Western influence," such as banks and liquor stores. After Khomeini called for the shah's overthrow, mass protests and a soldiers' mutiny, forced the collapse of his regime. The shah fled Iran in January 1979, and in February, Khomeini returned from exile in Paris to take control of the revolution and direct it toward establishing a theocratic republic based on Islamic law, displacing moderate civilians in the interim government. The December 1979 constitution provided for a president and parliament elected through universal adult suffrage, but unelected institutions controlled by hardline clerics were empowered to approve electoral candidates and certify that the decisions of elected officials were in accord with Sharia (Islamic law). Khomeini was named Supreme Leader and invested with control over the security and intelligence services, armed forces, and judiciary.

Kazakhstan

Transition Point	1989-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	5	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Independence came in 1991 with the disintegration of the USSR. Civic activism was led by small environmental, writers, and student groups focused on cultural rights and ecological problems, including the effects of radiation from Soviet nuclear-testing sites. Still, no broadly-based civic movement coalesced, and the process toward independent statehood was mainly led by the indigenous Communist elite.

Kyrgyzstan

Transition Point	1989-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	5	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Civic activism was led by writers and academics who initially pressed for greater cultural rights. A weak coalition of civic and political movements, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, emerged in 1990. At the time of the Soviet coup of August 1991, the Soviet republic's President Akayev, then a well-regarded academic, backed Russia's President Yeltsin against the coup plotters. With the support of some party officials and civic groups, President Akayev pressed for full state independence.

Latvia

Transition Point	1989-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	1	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

In the late 1980s, a broad-based Popular Front of Latvia emerged to press through nonviolent means for autonomy and state independence in the then-Soviet republic. By 1989, the Front and its allies had won a majority in elections to the local Soviet legislature, which proclaimed "sovereignty" in July 1989. Years of mass protests, led by the Front and a broad coalition of civic groups and political parties, involved hundreds of thousands of people in direct civic action—likely a majority of the country's adults took part in the civic mobilization at one point or another. Five protestors died and many more were wounded in nonviolent opposition to a Latvian coup attempt in January 1991 led by hardliners supported by counterparts in the Kremlin. With the collapse of the August 1991 coup in Moscow, Latvia rapidly proclaimed independence from the disintegrating USSR and was recognized by the international community.

Lithuania

Transition Point 1989-91

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Mass protests, independent labor unions, and vigorous cultural and civic organizations emerged during the transition to democratic independence in Lithuania. Demonstrations calling for national independence and human rights engaged hundreds of thousands of participants and were a recurrent event. A violent Soviet crackdown in January 1991 led to the death of 15 protestors and the wounding of hundreds, only fueling further nonviolent mass protest.

A nonviolent umbrella civic movement, Sajudis, was the emerging state's main force for independence and democratic change. Independence was proclaimed in the aftermath of an aborted August 1991 coup in Moscow. The move toward freedom had broad support from leaders of the independence-minded Russian Federation, Ukraine, and other republics that eventually also broke free of and dismantled the USSR.

Macedonia

Transition Point 1990-91

	CL	STATUS
	4	PF
Rating (2004)	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Macedonia's political transition occurred in early 1991 after the country's peaceful secession from Yugoslavia. In September 1990, the Macedonian League of Communists slowly loosened its grip on power and initiated democratic reforms from the top. The party leadership accepted the emerging civil society movements and proceeded to adopt several laws and constitutional amendments guaranteeing universal suffrage and the right to form political organizations. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), a party founded by anti-communist nationalists, emerged in late 1990 and became the main contender for power.

Macedonia held its first free, multiparty elections on January 25, 1991, following which the state assembly proclaimed Macedonian independence from Yugoslavia. The former communist party, now transformed into the Social-Democratic League of Macedonia, won thirty-one seats, and the VMRO-DPMNE won thirty-seven seats. The newly-elected president, Kiro Gligorov, was able to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army, thereby completing Macedonia's transition and making it the only republic of the former Yugoslavia to achieve its independence without war.

Madagascar

Transition Point 1991-93

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1990	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	63	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The easing of political restrictions in the late 1980s facilitated the emergence of a potent civic movement, the Hery Velona, calling for political and economic reform of Madagascar's socialist dominant-party state. Led by opposition leaders such as Albery Zafy and Rakotoniana Manandafy, civic forces employed largely peaceful demonstrations with effective general strikes to pressure long-time president Didier Ratsiraka. In response, Ratsiraka replaced his prime minister in 1991 but failed to quell the protests, a scenario exacerbated by the killing of 30 peaceful demonstrators by government troops later that year. With his position severely weakened, Ratsiraka agreed to transitional negotiations at the Panorama Convention, resulting in the creation of an 18-month interim government and the stripping of almost all the president's powers. In 1992, a National Forum of civic and political groups drafted a new constitution; provisions prohibiting the incumbent president from running for reelection caused violent clashes between pro-Ratsiraka "federalists" and troops guarding the Forum. Nevertheless, and despite federalist efforts to disrupt the vote, the Constitution was approved by a wide margin in an August 1992 referendum. In November 1992, presidential elections were held, resulting in a run-off between Ratsiraka (whom the High Court deemed eligible to compete despite forceful objections) and Albert Zafy. February 1993 saw Zafy defeat Ratsiraka in the runoff presidential election with 65 percent of the vote.

Malawi

Transition Point 1992-94

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1991	7	6	NF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The end of authoritarian rule in Malawi began in March 1992 with the issuance of a letter by the country's Catholic bishops criticizing the government's abysmal human rights record, which was followed by a series of popular protests led by trade union, student, and internal opposition groups. A subsequent crackdown by dictator Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his paramilitary Young Pioneers led Western donor countries to suspend aid programs in May 1993. As a result, Banda approved the holding of a referendum on multiparty democracy, which was overwhelmingly approved by Malawians in a July 1993 vote. By way of negotiation between Banda and recently-legalized opposition parties, the constitution was amended to include a bill of rights and allow for multiparty elections. The elections were held in May 1994 and saw the defeat of Banda and the victory of Bakili Muluzi and his United Democratic Front, which formed a coalition government with the Alliance for Democracy. However, while generally free and fair, the elections were marred by voter intimidation and violence, most of it on the part of Young Pioneers who had not been fully disbanded by the army the previous year. Since then, Malawian elections have featured significant incidents of voter fraud and election-related violence.

Mali**Transition Point** 1991

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1990	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

In 1991, Mali's post-independence legacy of military and one-party dictatorships, corruption, and economic mismanagement combined with a devastating drought to catalyze a series of large student-led civic protests demanding a multiparty political system. After 106 demonstrators were killed by the armed forces in March, the army refused to continue suppressing the protests and, under the leadership of reformist Amandou Toumani Toure, deposed dictator Moussa Traore via a military coup. A Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People, consisting of military and anti-Traore civilian leaders, was set up, legalizing opposition parties and establishing a National Conference of civic and political groups. The Conference drafted a new constitution (approved by referendum) that called for competitive elections; an elected government, headed by Amandou Toure, emerged in 1992.

Mexico**Transition Point** 2000

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1999	3	4	PF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

The disputed victory of Carlos Salinas over Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in 1988 spelled the beginning of the end of the rule of the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI). The election marked the first time that the PRI did not win a supermajority in the Federal Congress, requiring it to obtain support from others to carry out its agenda. As a result, Cardenas's left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the pro-business Party of National Action (PAN) were able to extract electoral reforms from the PRI, the most significant of which was the establishment in 1996 of the Federal Electoral Institute, an independent institution charged with control of the electoral process. The Peso crisis of 1994 contributed to the overwhelming defeat of the PRI in municipal, gubernatorial, and congressional elections in the mid-1990s, culminating in its loss of control of Congress in 1997. The 2000 presidential elections, held under intense international scrutiny, produced a surprising victory by the PAN's candidate, Vicente Fox Quesada, marking the end of over seventy years of one-party rule.

Moldova**Transition Point** 1989

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	3	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Moldova's path to independence was driven by the Moldovan Popular Front, a movement pressing first for cultural autonomy, later for statehood, and still later—on the part of a radical minority—for reunification with Romania. The Popular Front derived its primary support from the nearly two-thirds of the population that was ethnically Romanian. As the movement toward independence spread, violence erupted in 1990 between ethnic Romanians and Slavs primarily living in the Transnistria region of the country. Initially, the Popular Front made common cause with pro-autonomy leaders of the local Communist Party, who took up the aim of independence and steered the country to statehood in coalition with non-Communists. Early in its life, the Popular Front splintered, with rival groups advocating more extreme actions with the aim of responding to events in the breakaway region of Transnistria.

Mongolia

Transition Point 1990

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	7	7	NF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Mongolia's transition from Soviet satellite to democratic republic began in early 1990, when the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP, the former Communist Party) responded to growing civic protests by legalizing opposition parties and holding the country's first multiparty elections. In the wake of the 1989 East European anti-Communist revolutions, a group of Mongolian dissidents initiated public civic gatherings, which became the core of the nonviolent reform movement. These unofficial civil society meetings gave birth to several prominent political groups, including the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), which organized popular street protests and hunger strikes leading to the resignation of much of the MPRP leadership, in March 1990. These changes were also facilitated by reform-leaning MPRP members, who assumed power following the resignation of the old hardline leadership. Facing an unprepared opposition, the newly-reformed MPRP easily won the country's first free parliamentary elections, quickly called in July 1990, and continued on the path of economic and social liberalization.

Mozambique

Transition Point 1992-1994

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1991	6	4	NF
Rating (2004)	3	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

An internationally-brokered peace accord between the ruling FRELIMO party and the rebel RENAMO faction ended a brutal civil war and catalyzed Mozambique's transition from a one-party state to an electoral democracy. The General Peace Accord followed up on a 1990 constitution (which called for multiparty democracy, freedom of expression and belief, greater associational rights and an independent judiciary) by replacing warring factions with political parties and establishing guarantees for civil liberties, an independent judiciary, a unified armed forces, and the repatriation of internal and external refugees. International negotiations succeeded in getting both parties to agree to an October 1994 election date. These developments occurred amid the global

collapse of Marxist governments and were aided by South Africa's withdrawal of support for RENAMO. The legislative and presidential elections took place as scheduled and saw FRELIMO emerge victorious in a process declared free and fair by independent monitors. While RENAMO did not win, it captured 112 seats (out of 250) in the Parliament and accepted the results without violence. Subsequent elections have evidenced increasing political maturity in Mozambique, though FRELIMO continues to dominate the country's political system.

Nepal

Transition Point 1990

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	4	5	PF
Rating (2004)	5	5	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

The democratic transition in Nepal began in 1990 when King Birendra, faced with escalating social unrest and violence, lifted a formal twenty-nine-year ban on political-party activity and agreed to a draft constitution that called for both a monarchy and a popularly elected parliament. The popular uprising followed India's refusal to renew trade and transit agreements with Nepal, causing shortages of food and medicine. The Nepali Congress Party, which existed illegally under the Birendra regime, launched peaceful demonstrations countrywide, advocating a democratic, multiparty system of government. Shortly thereafter, several hundred members of the opposition party were arrested, newspapers that opposed the regime were shut down, and, in several instances, police officers opened fire into the crowds, killing dozens of civilians. The killing of young Nepali demonstrators mobilized support for the opposition, even among doctors, lawyers, and other segments of the professional elite, who traditionally avoided involvement in politics. On April 6, 1990, the security forces fired on a crowd of over 100,000, killing approximately 150 people. Two days later, Birendra agreed to remove the ban on political parties, a decision that paved the way to a new constitution, which guaranteed free elections, an independent press, and the right of workers to unionize.

Nicaragua

Transition Point 1990

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	3	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

In the two years before elections in 1990, the Contras continued to wage a low-intensity civil war against the leftist Sandinista dictatorship, but the killings and violence had significantly declined from the brutality of the mid-1980s. As the election approached, opposition civic life included a small, independent trade union movement, business organizations, independent political parties, and independent print and radio that were frequently under state pressure. The Feb. 1990 elections saw the defeat of the Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega, by the candidate of the National Opposition Union, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

Nigeria**Transition Point** 1998-99

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1997	7	6	NF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

The death of General Sani Abacha and the accession of General Abdulsalami Abubakar in 1998 facilitated the Nigerian transition from military rule to electoral democracy. Responding in part to pro-democracy protests, Abubakar abided by Abacha's pledge to implement civilian rule and took significant steps in that direction: replacing Abacha's security staff and cabinet, abolishing a ban on trade union activity and releasing two imprisoned union leaders, creating more space for press freedom and civic activism, and appointing the Independent National Electoral Commission to conduct elections for local, state, and national governing bodies. Local elections were held in December 1998, followed the next month by state elections. National presidential and legislative elections were held in February 1999 and saw the victory of former military leader Olusegun Obasanjo and the electoral dominance of his People's Democratic Party. While the election was marred by widespread allegations of fraud, and Obasanjo's victory was challenged in court, the elections were largely representative of the people's will. In May 1999, right before Obasanjo's inauguration, Abubakar approved an updated version of the suspended 1979 democratic constitution.

Panama**Transition Point** 1989

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	7	6	NF
Rating (2004)	1	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Outside Intervention
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

In the spring of 1988, the U.S. Department of Justice announced indictments against Panamanian strongman General Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking, and the U.S. government quickly imposed full economic sanctions on Panama. Noriega annulled his country's presidential election in May 1989 that had appeared to produce an overwhelming victory for the opposition coalition of candidates. After a U.S. marine was shot dead by the Panamanian Defense Force on December 16 of that year, President George H.W. Bush ordered a massive invasion on December 20 that employed 24,000 American troops and led to the deaths of as many as 3,000 Panamanians and 26 American military personnel. The U.S. installed Guillermo Endara, the head of the opposition, as Panama's new president on the morning of the invasion, and Noriega was arrested approximately two weeks later.

Paraguay**Transition Point** 1989

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	6	NF
Rating (2004)	3	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

In a February 1989 coup that killed approximately 200 soldiers, General Alfredo Stroessner's 35-year-old dictatorship was overthrown by Stroessner's second in command and long-time aide, General Andres Rodriguez. A flawed election in May 1989 installed Rodriguez as president. The new government reformed various aspects of the electoral law in 1990 and promulgated a new constitution in 1992 that banned military officers from political-party activity and provided a significantly liberalized legal framework that restored civil liberties and allowed for the reemergence of a free press. Rodriguez opted not to stand for the 1993 elections that were won by his anointed candidate, the civilian engineer Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Both have been members of Paraguay's long-ruling Colorado Party, which continues to maintain its grip on power.

Peru

Transition Point	2000-01		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1999	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	2	3	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Following incumbent President Alberto Fujimori's disputed reelection in a May 2000 runoff election, a major corruption scandal emerged in September of that year centering on Fujimori's right-hand man and intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. Massive street demonstrations calling for the spy chief's arrest and the president's resignation, coupled with an erosion of support from the ruling elite, led Fujimori to announce his intention to hold new national elections the following year in which he would not be a candidate. Mounting civic pressure forced him to resign prematurely in November 2000 while in Japan, where he now lives in exile. Congress replaced him with a caretaker government that steered the nation toward free and fair national elections won by democratic opposition leader Alejandro Toledo in June 2001.

Philippines

Transition Point	1986		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1985	4	3	PF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Long-time dictator Ferdinand Marcos left office in 1986 amid massive popular protests against a fraudulent election, marking the Philippines' transition from authoritarian rule. In the years preceding his flight, the public became deeply disillusioned by Marcos, who had corruptly accumulated great wealth during the country's economic deterioration and ordered the assassination of Benigno Aquino, a leading opposition figure, whose death in 1983 gave momentum to a growing opposition movement. In November 1985, plagued by growing popular discontent and pressure from the United States, Marcos agreed to hold presidential elections. An election took place in February 1986, and by the official count, Marcos had won. However, the vote was marred by widespread irregularities as Marcos's supporters manipulated the vote count, stole ballot boxes, and even shot opposition supporters. The crisis provoked the massive "People Power" protests; soon after, even military leaders professed their support for the opposition. With little hope of retaining power, Marcos fled the country and Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency, which she had legitimately won.

Poland

Transition Point	1989-90		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

After martial law in December 1981 plunged the Communist state into a period of widespread repression, the Solidarity movement functioned underground until its legalization in 1989. While operating clandestinely, the union movement and a related civic-political resistance movement established an underground press, alternative cultural institutions, strike funds, and networks of mutual support. Waves of strikes and protests in 1989 forced the Communist authorities to the bargaining table. This resulted in a comprehensive roundtable settlement that legalized the union movement in 1988 and opened the door to an eventual electoral victory for Solidarity and its leader, Lech Walesa, in 1989-90.

Portugal

Transition Point	1974-1976		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1973	5	6	NF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The April 25, 1974 coup d'état by the Armed Forces Movement ousted the remnants of the Salazar dictatorship, triggering Portugal's eventual transition to democratic pluralism. Demonstrations by tens of thousands celebrated the end of the regime and called for further change. A series of military-led transitional governments ruled over the next two years as newly-formed civilian political parties vied for popular support. Over the course of the "Carnation Revolution," radical elements surfaced in both the private sphere, with workers occasionally violently seizing control of businesses from employers, and the public sphere, with mass leftist demonstrations leading to the nationalization of banks. However, moderate civilian forces eventually emerged from the turmoil, and many in the military welcomed the transition to democracy that was signaled by the promulgation in 1976 of a democratic constitution by an elected Constituent Assembly made up mostly of representatives of mainstream political parties. Democracy was further consolidated in 1982, a year that saw the election of a civilian prime minister and amendments to the constitution that weakened the power of the president and placed the military under civilian control.

Romania

Transition Point	1989-90		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	7	7	NF
Rating (2004)	3	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

The collapse of the rule of Communist tyrant Nicolae Ceausescu was precipitated by growing public discontent that appeared in part to have been orchestrated by segments of the country's Communist leadership. Protests against Ceausescu caused him to flee Bucharest and resulted in his execution on December 25, 1989. The movement to unseat him was accompanied by significant violence that claimed hundreds of victims. In 1990, public civic discontent against the post-Ceausescu National Salvation Front, dominated by former party officials, forced the acceptance of an end to one-party rule and allowed for the emergence of opposition political parties and independent media that over time led to the emergence of a competitive democratic system. In the months that followed Ceausescu's fall from power, independent political life was marred by significant violence directed at the opposition.

Russia

Transition Point	1988-89		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	5	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Amid a general political relaxation resulting from the official policy of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reform), the Russian Federation of the USSR saw the emergence of active civic and labor organizations in the late 1980s. Some demonstrations in the period 1989-91 gathered as many as 100,000 participants, but were largely confined to major urban centers; most parts of the country were quiescent. A coup attempt in August 1991 failed amid widespread civic protest that reached massive proportion in the capital, Moscow, and the second city, Leningrad, contributing to divisions in the ranks of the military, much of which refused to impose martial law. The transition occurred as a result of centripetal pressures that split apart the USSR, the growing belief that the Soviet Communist model had failed, and as support for the dismantling of the union state by significant portions of the ruling elite.

Senegal

Transition Point	2000-01		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1999	4	4	PF
Rating (2004)	2	3	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Despite a formal constitutional right to competitive multiparty elections since independence in 1960, it was only the presidential elections in March 2000 that marked the end of the Socialist Party's (PS) undemocratic dominance of Senegalese politics. While nominal elections had been held since 1981, they were widely discredited as non-competitive and heavily slanted toward PS leader Abdou Diouf. However, despite some electoral violence and a first-round loss, the March 2000 elections saw the victory of long-time opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade in a second-round runoff. Wade defeated Diouf by consolidating opposition political support unavailable to him in the first round. In January 2001, Wade dissolved the impotent National Assembly and called for new legislative elections in April after Senegalese passed a constitutional amendment reducing presidential terms from seven to five years, setting the limit of terms at two, and giving women the right to own land for the first time.

Serbia-Montenegro

Transition Point	2000		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1999	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	3	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Serbia's transition to democratic rule occurred in September 2000 after the opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, defeated Slobodan Milosevic in a disputed presidential election. The beginning of the end of the Milosevic regime came in January 2000 when members of the Serbian opposition ended their internal disagreements and joined forces under the banner of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) in an effort to remove Milosevic from power. Although Milosevic had an advantage over the opposition as a result of his control over the country's security forces and the state-owned media, his popular support had dwindled because of widespread frustrations over the policies that provoked the NATO bombing and led Serbia into international isolation. One important force that influenced public opinion was the pro-democracy

student movement Otpor that originated in 1998 to protest oppression at Belgrade University. The movement quickly grew into a nationwide network that ultimately included over 70,000 supporters including students, professionals, and pensioners.

Confident in his political strength, Milosevic called for elections to be held in late September 2000, in order to demonstrate the regime's legitimacy. According to various election monitors and international public opinion surveys, Vojislav Kostunica, who represented the Serbian opposition, had won. After Milosevic refused to concede his power, approximately one million people, led by Otpor activists and opposition parties, converged on Belgrade to protest the regime's attempts to steal the election. The crowd surged through the parliament and took over the state media. After Milosevic's loyal security forces abandoned him, he publicly conceded to Kostunica. The parliamentary elections held that December solidified the opposition's hold on power and marked the completion of Serbia's transition to democracy.

Slovakia

Transition Point 1989

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	7	6	NF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The transition that led to the collapse of one-party Communist rule and to the emergence in 1992 of an independent Slovak state—in what was termed a “velvet divorce” with the Czech Republic—is rooted in the nonviolent civic protests of November 1989. The massive protests that involved hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the streets of Bratislava—reinforcing similar protests in Prague, Brno, and other major Czech cities—culminated in a general strike on November 28, 1989. The work stoppage, which occurred throughout the Czech and Slovak regions of the then-unified state of Czechoslovakia, led to an announcement by the Communist authorities that they would end their monopoly on power.

By the end of the year, roundtable talks paved the way to national presidential and parliamentary elections in 1990, which resulted in the election of opposition democratic reform politicians. In Slovakia, the People Against Violence (a sister organization to the Czech Forum) emerged as a cohesive democratic popular front, uniting workers, students, and the intelligentsia.

Slovenia

Transition Point 1990-92

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1979	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Slovenia's political transition was completed in 1992 after Slovenia held its first presidential and parliamentary elections, which followed the country's partition from Yugoslavia.

In the years preceding the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Slovenian League of Communists underwent significant changes. The party became increasingly tolerant of the emerging social movements and introduced important reforms, including competitive elections within the party's ranks and an amendment to the Slovenian Constitution guaranteeing political pluralism. In addition, a broad protest movement helped press for multiparty elections, which occurred in 1990. Although the reformed communists received the most votes among nine major contenders, a coalition of seven opposition parties was able to form a new government that proceeded to tackle issues such as the revision of the constitution, electoral reform, and economic reconstruction. The winning coalition also pushed for the country's independence from Yugoslavia, an issue that was supported by over 90 percent of Slovenes in the December 1990 referendum. By June 1991, civic and political forces had pressed forward with a declaration of independence.

Slovenia was officially recognized as an independent democratic state following a ten-day war with the Yugoslav People's Army, which was ordered to protect Yugoslav borders. Multiparty elections were held in 1992 in the context of a vibrant media and vigorous civic life.

South Africa

Transition Point 1990-92

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	6	5	PF
Rating (2004)	1	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

South Africa's transition from racial apartheid to inclusive democracy gained momentum in 1990 with National Party (NP) leader and President F.W. de Klerk's decision to release African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela from 27 years of imprisonment and begin a process of negotiations with the previously illegal ANC. But the roots of the transition process could be found in a longtime campaign of civic resistance led in the 1980's by the United Democratic Front (UDF). A large civic movement, led by trade unions, student groups, and the UDF, used primarily nonviolent means to pressure the government. Some local UDF adherents engaged in violent tactics as well. At the second Convention for a Democratic South Africa in 1992, the NP, the ANC, and 17 opposition parties all participated in negotiations aimed at facilitating the transition to “one man, one vote” democracy. A whites-only referendum in the same year saw 69 percent of voters endorse de Klerk's plan of further negotiations with African parties. Bilateral

talks between the government and the ANC began soon after, resulting in a Record of Understanding, signed by de Klerk and Mandela.

In November 1993, this agreement was codified in a formal accord and interim constitution calling for the holding of universal elections in 1994 and the establishment of a 5-year Transitional Government of National Unity, as well as a series of other political, legal, and compensatory mechanisms to ensure a stable and fair transition to democratic rule. Despite fervent pro-apartheid protests and significant violence among African political factions, national elections were held in April 1994, resulting in an overwhelming victory for the ANC, the election of Mandela as president, and the peaceful establishment of a national unity government including the ANC, the NP, and the mostly-Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party.

South Korea

Transition Point 1987

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1986	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

South Korea's democratic transition began in 1987, when military strongman Chun Doo-Hwan gave in to widespread protests led by student and labor movements and allowed his successor to be chosen in a direct presidential election.

In 1986, Chun, like several of his predecessors, considered extending his presidential tenure by passing a constitutional amendment that would grant him an additional term in office. However, his scheme produced considerable public backlash, which strengthened even after he gave up his plan. First, opposition parties formed coalitions with powerful student and labor groups, and continued pressuring the government. Then, in early 1987, after government forces killed several students, the Korean middle class began to join in the mass protests. This forced Chun to accept the opposition's demands and adopt an amendment guaranteeing direct presidential elections.

Spain

Transition Point 1975-77

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1974	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

Skillful leadership on the part of King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez facilitated Spain's smooth transition from military dictatorship to multiparty democracy. The death of General Francisco Franco in November 1975 produced a volatile political atmosphere marked on one side by mass public demonstrations calling for reform, and on the other by strong opposition from the military and within Francoist circles to any change in the political order. King Juan Carlos, whose ties to the military earned him its allegiance, and Suarez, a Francoist party leader, negotiated this difficult situation through pragmatic political leadership, initiating several reforms including the dissolution of the Francoist parliament, the relegalization of all political parties—including the Communist Party—in advance of free parliamentary elections in June 1977, and the promulgation of a new constitution in December 1978.

Taiwan

Transition Point 1992

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1991	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	2	2	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Power-holders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Taiwan's democratic transition unfolded as the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), gradually loosened its grip on power and initiated democratic reforms. The first step toward systematic liberalization came in 1986, when, after 38 years, martial law was lifted and Taiwanese gained freedom of assembly and association. Several parties—including the Democratic Progressive Party, the Chinese New Party, and the Taiwan Independence Party—emerged as the opposition leaders, occasionally protesting and continuously pressing the ruling KMT in negotiations. After years of steady liberalization, popular elections were introduced: first for the national assembly in 1992, then for provincial governorships in 1994, and finally for president in 1996.

Tajikistan

Transition Point	1989-91		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	6	5	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Serious momentum for political change in the poorest Soviet republic began in 1990 under a newly formed national movement Rastokhez (Re-birth). Protests, some of them violently suppressed, focused on social and economic grievances. An internal state of emergency was proclaimed by local authorities. The years prior to state independence were marked by the emergence of a moderate Islamic party and more extreme radical Islamist currents, some of them armed. In the months after independence was proclaimed in December 1991, the hardline Communist leadership then in power established the initial contours of the state. But the ethnically divided country soon after was plunged into a widescale civil war.

Tanzania

Transition Point	1994-95		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1993	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	4	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

The end of Tanzania's one-party system began in 1992 when President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, which had completely dominated the country since 1961, altered the constitution to allow for opposition parties and related reforms. This decision was made in part due to civic pressure for more representative government. The legislative elections in 1995, while featuring 11 opposition parties, resulted in a landslide victory for the CCM that was seriously tainted by poor organization, fraud, administrative irregularities, and unequal allocations of state broadcasting time. The voting in Zanzibar was plainly fraudulent. Though slightly improved, Tanzania's elections continue to be marred by fraud and weak opposition parties, particularly on the island of Zanzibar.

Thailand

Transition Point	1991-92		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1990	6	4	PF
Rating (2004)	2	3	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

After a brief experiment with democracy, the military took power in 1976. In 1988, the military, under General Prem, sparked the beginning of a transition back to democracy by supporting gradual liberalization. However, in 1991, the Thai army staged a bloodless coup against elected president Chatichai Choonhavan, claiming that Choonhavan's administration was riddled with corruption. Soon thereafter, the pro-military National Assembly adopted a controversial new constitution that allowed the military to appoint the senate and recommend to the king an unelected prime minister. Civilians protested the former coup leader's appointment and called for the government to name an elected prime minister. For weeks, thousands of people demonstrated in Bangkok, and some opposition members wore black to the opening session of the parliament. In May 1992, hundreds of thousands of protesters filled the streets. After a march on the prime minister's residence, the military opened fire, killing dozens of protesters and arresting thousands. Following three weeks of violence, the parliament amended the constitution to ensure that future prime ministers were chosen from among the elected members of parliament and scheduled new elections to be held in September 2005.

Turkey

Transition Point	1981-83		
	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition):	5	5	PF
Rating (2004)	3	3	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Significant Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Moderate

Narrative

Amid economic crisis, growing violence, and the loss of effective government control, the National Security Council (MGK), led by the Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren, seized control of the Turkish government in a coup on September 12, 1980. In June 1981, the MGK promulgated a Constituent Assembly, appointing an Advisory Assembly to craft a new, multiparty constitution with the MGK. The new constitution was submitted to a public referendum in November 1982. Consequently, Evren acquired the title of "President." In April of 1983, the government enacted the Political Parties Law, gradually permitting political activity and the formation of new political parties. Five new parties organized to compete in an election scheduled for November 1983. However, the MGK vetoed most candidates of the Social Democratic Party and the Islamist True Path Party, and the poll was contested between the National Democratic Party, the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the Populist Party. ANAP, led by Turgut Ozal, secured victory with 45.1 percent of the vote, and formed a government in December 1983. The MGK gave up governing power, although four of its members remained on the Presidential Council.

Uganda

Transition Point 1986

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1985	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	5	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

Insurgent forces under the command of Yoweri Museveni seized Kampala in January 1986 and took control of the country, forcing Uganda's military leader, General Tito Okello, to flee to Sudan. Museveni's National Resistance Army formed a new government, with Museveni designated as president and head of a new political grouping, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). While resisting democratic reforms, the NRM-dominated government has ended most of the egregious human rights abuses of previous Ugandan regimes, provides for a moderate degree of press freedom, and has undertaken a series of successful economic reforms.

Uruguay

Transition Point 1984-1985

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1983	5	4	PF
Rating (2004)	1	1	F

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Mixed: Civic/Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

In an effort to legitimate its power, Uruguay's military dictatorship submitted to a plebiscite in 1980 a new constitution that institutionalized the military's influence over government policy. It was rejected by 57 percent of the population, and the result spurred dialogue between the government and the opposition. Most political parties were reinstated in 1982, followed shortly thereafter by elections of party officials in which anti-military candidates of the two main opposition parties were overwhelmingly successful. Labor and students demonstrated separately in 1983 amidst a major economic crisis, and a massive political rally in Montevideo of all opposition parties later in the year demanded new democratic elections. Labor and civil strikes in early 1984 pressed the military into negotiations with the major opposition parties. A result of these discussions was the military's agreement to hold national elections in November, in which the opposition Colorado Party's Julio Maria Sanguinetti emerged victorious. He took office in March 1985.

Uzbekistan

Transition Point 1989-91

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1988	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	7	6	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Mostly Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

An active civic movement, the Birlık (Unity) Peoples Movement, initially pressed for language and cultural rights as well as redress of ecological problems. Birlık's efforts in 1989-90 were joined by student, environmental, and political groups. This activism was primarily centered on the capital, Tashkent. When the failed hardliner Soviet coup collapsed in August 1991, Uzbek civic groups pressed for independence. But the process toward statehood—which was declared in December 1991—was mainly led by the indigenous Communist elite. Some protests were suppressed through state violence.

Zambia

Transition Point

1990-91

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1989	6	5	PF
Rating (2004)	4	4	PF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	Nonviolent
Forces Driving The Transition	Civic
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Strong

Narrative

The end of Zambia's one-party state under longtime president Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) was brought about by massive social unrest amid economic stagnation and falling living standards. A civic movement of then-banned opposition political parties emerged under the umbrella of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), headed by labor leader Frederick Chiluba. Kaunda attempted to head off popular pressures by proposing a referendum on multiparty democracy; however, continued robust opposition led Kaunda to amend the constitution and allow for electoral democracy without a referendum. As a result, Zambia's first multiparty elections for parliament and the presidency since the 1960s were held in October 1991. Chiluba resoundingly carried the presidential election over Kaunda with 81% of the vote, while the MMD won 125 out of 150 seats in parliament in an election deemed free and fair.

Zimbabwe

Transition Point

1977-79

	PR	CL	STATUS
Freedom Rating (Year before transition): 1976	6	5	NF
Rating (2004)	7	6	NF

Transition Characteristics

The Factor Of Violence	High Level Of Violence
Sources Of Violence	State & Opposition
Forces Driving The Transition	Powerholders
Strength Of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions	Weak Or Absent

Narrative

In 1976, economic sanctions, guerrilla warfare, the end of Portuguese colonial rule in neighboring countries, and diplomatic pressure forced the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith to agree in principle to majority rule and to meet with black nationalist leaders. The following year, amid international pressure, an "internal settlement" was signed by the Smith government and black leaders including Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Rev. Nadabingi Sithole, but excluding Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party. The settlement provided for qualified majority rule and free elections, held in April 1979, resulting in a victory for Muzorewa. However, the guerrilla conflict that had killed thousands did not end, and later that year Britain convened deliberations with the African parties in London. On December 21, 1979, an agreement was signed in London calling for a cease-fire, new elections, a transition period under British rule, and a new

constitution implementing majority rule while protecting minority rights. The UN Security Council approved the settlement and lifted all sanctions on the soon-to-be independent state of Zimbabwe. Free and fair elections were held in February 1980 and resulted in a victory for Robert Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party, who formed the first government. Zimbabwe was granted independence in April, and its first representative parliament convened in May.

Methodology

Methodology for the Research Study



Summary

This Freedom House study examines and codes all political transitions that have occurred since 1972, the beginning of what political scientists call the “Third Wave” of democratization. In all, 67 transitions were identified and coded based on the 33-year time series and narrative data of the *Freedom in the World* survey. The report was conducted in collaboration with the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

The purpose of the study is to determine whether key characteristics of the transition are related to—and correlate with—the type of post-transition state that emerges. The study rigorously tests the hypothesis that regime/system changes precipitated by strong, cohesive nonviolent civic coalitions are disposed toward the emergence of durable democratic government.

Transitions are examined and countries categorized according to the following typology:

Characteristics of the Transition

The Factor of Violence

- Nonviolent
- Mostly Nonviolent
- Some Violence
- High Levels of Violence

Sources of Violence

- State
- State and opposition

Forces Driving the Transition

- Powerholders
- Mixed: Civic Forces and Powerholders
- Civic Forces
- Military Intervention (External)

Strength of Nonviolent Civic Forces

- Strong
- Moderate
- Weak or Absent

The study examines the relationship between the type of transition a country undergoes and the outcome in terms of the nature of the regime after the transition. The freedom ratings are derived from the annual Freedom House survey *Freedom in the World*, and include the category rating (Free, Partly Free, Not Free) and the numerical rating (1-7), with 1 representing best practices in the areas of political rights and civil liberties and 7 representing the worst practices. Post-transition ratings are taken from the most recent edition of the survey, *Freedom in the World 2005*.

Some countries have undergone more than one transition in the 33-year period under review. In such instances, the study includes and evaluates only the most recent transition.

The study also excludes political transitions caused by explicit de-colonization and military coups (when such coups occurred in the absence of—and independent of—civic ferment). It excludes transitions in countries with a population under one million people. It also excludes transitions—such as those in Ukraine in 2004 and Georgia in 2003-- that occurred in the last two years, as it is too early to assess the full effect of these transitions.

Definitions of Terms

A) Transition and Time Frame

Transition

For the purposes of the study, the term “Transition” is applied to the following:

- a) transition from a one-party to a multiparty system
- b) transition from authoritarian government to democratic rule
- c) transition from monarchy to any form of civilian rule
- d) transition from a dominant-party state to multiparty democracy
- e) post-conflict regime change
- f) the emergence of a new state as a result of the decomposition of a larger, usually multinational state

Transition Point

The term “Transition Point” refers to the:

- a) Time of national executive leadership changes
- b) Date of the election of a new national leadership (or the installation of a new leadership in non-electoral transitions) issuing from a constitution representing a fundamentally new political system
- c) Date of the signing of a post-conflict settlement (in the case of civil wars)

Transition Period

For the purposes of this study, the term “Transition Period” is based on the definitions of the terms “Transition” and “Transition Point”, as noted above. Under these definitions, the study determines the typology of the Transition based on the characteristics present in the two-years preceding the Transition Point.

Time Frame

The time frame covered the period 1972-2005 (the period in which Freedom House has conducted its annual survey, Freedom in the World).

B) Definitions of the terms “High Level of Violence”, “Significant Violence”, Mostly Nonviolent”, and “Nonviolent”:

“**High Level of Violence**” is defined as the following conditions occurring in the two-years before the transition:

- a) an ongoing civil war
- b) major and widespread political violence (including violent ethnic and religious sectarian conflict) with many hundreds or more deaths
- c) a widespread military operation, involving nationwide, long-term deployment of military/security forces and resulting in hundreds or more deaths
- d) a campaign of political killings and disappearances of many hundreds or more victims

“**Significant Violence**” is defined as dozens or hundreds killed short of the above threshold and conditions.

“**Mostly Nonviolent**” is defined as the deaths of a handful of people.

“**Nonviolent**” is defined as a condition in which the two-year pre-transition period did not result in fatalities.

Note:

The factors used in this study to assess violence exclude many of the other brutal and violent methods authoritarian regimes often use to suppress and control their populations. These include torture and physical intimidation of political opponents and prisoners of conscience. These were excluded because there is no comprehensive, comparative source of data for these abuses. In the end, we settled on those indicators that were most likely to be widely reported and recorded across the broad array of states we examined.

C) Definitions for the “Sources of Violence”:

In cases of transitions that are preceded by “high levels of violence” or “significant violence” we examine the sources of violence. Under the rubric “**Only State Violence**” we code those cases where the state was the only or overwhelming source of violence. We code as “State and Opposition Violence” those settings in which there was both state violence and a) a guerrilla opposition movement; b) major acts of opposition terror; c) violence by segments of the opposition against the government and against political rivals.

D) Definitions of the terms “Civic Forces,” “Powerholders,” “Mixed: Civic/Powerholders,” and “External Intervention (Military)” Transitions:

The determination of whether a transition is caused by Civic Forces, Powerholders, Mixed: Civic/Powerholders, or External Intervention (Military) is made by answering the fundamental question: What was the driving force of the transition?

The definition recognizes that in any setting “powerholders” are always present. However, the driving force is determined as the indispensable factor without whose positive action the transition would not have occurred. This would exclude decisions by militaries not to intercede in the process.

Civic Forces Transition

The term “**Civic Forces Transition**” is defined as one in which the major impetus for the transition came the grassroots civic resistance led by civic organizations, student, trade union and other groups. Characteristic of such transitions is the presence of significant and organized civil society, which engages in nonviolent forms of resistance such as mass protests, strikes, boycotts, blockades, and/or civil disobedience. Mass civic protests, strikes, and other forms of nonviolent resistance can also occur in the absence of cohesive organizations. Occasionally, some civic forces employ violence or use force in self-defense. In all such transitions, the ruling elite is overwhelmingly opposed to systemic reform and is forced to make concessions under pressure of the civic movement and/or mass public protest.

Mixed: Civic Forces/Powerholder Transition

The term “**Mixed: Civic Forces/Powerholder Transition**” is defined as a transition in which there is both significant reform impetus from within the ruling elite and significant pressure from civic resistance. Countries included in this category are those where reforms are to a significant degree backed by important segments of the incumbent ruling elite, which acts in part from its own will/choice and in part as a result of external pressures from civil society and civic resistance.

Powerholder Transition

The term “**Powerholder Transition**” is defined as one in which top-down reforms and political/system changes are launched by powerful elites (military, economic, political) in the absence of significant pressure from civic resistance. Such transitions, for example, include both military-led processes that transfer authority back to the civilian sector, voluntary political reforms announced by autocratic leaders, and reforms by leaders acting as a result of external pressures.

External Intervention (Military) Transition

The term “**External Intervention (Military) Transition**” is defined as one in which the military forces of foreign countries or of international organizations are the driving forces behind regime change and the subsequent political transition.

E) Definitions of the Strength and Cohesion of Nonviolent Civic Coalitions

The study adopts the following definitions with regard to Nonviolent Civic Coalitions.

“**Strong**” refers to the presence of a powerful, cohesive leading civic umbrella coalition that adheres to nonviolent forms of civic resistance.

“**Moderate**” refers to civic forces that have considerable membership strength, but whose influence is weakened by a) a lack of unity represented by multiple groupings rather than a single broad-based coalition; b) the presence of rival civic forces that reject nonviolence and employ violent force in their struggle; c) settings in which there are some active civic groupings, but these groupings do not have significant mass membership support.

“**Weak or Absent**” refers to a weak civic infrastructure, the absence of a significant civic coalition and the absence of even modest mass support.

Research Process

Basic research was carried out by Freedom House staff on the basis of a methodology developed in cooperation with the Study Advisors on Methodology. Country reports and coding were done by Freedom House staff and then reviewed by the Academic Reviewers listed on page 49, either at a review meeting or through written comments.

Study Team

Study Director

Adrian Karatnycky

Study Advisor

Peter Ackerman

Study Researcher

Mark Y. Rosenberg

Study Assistants

Sanja Tatic

Alex Taurel

Study Advisors on Methodology

Tom Carothers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Jack DuVall (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict)

Dr. Joshua Murvachik (American Enterprise Institute)

Prof. Kurt Schock (Rutgers University)

Academic Reviewers

Prof. Michael McFaul (Stanford University)

Prof. Robert Rotberg (Harvard University)

Dr. Michael Shifter (Inter-American Dialogue)

Prof. Bridget Welsh (Johns Hopkins SAIS)

Statistician/Advisor

Dr. Jay Verkuilen (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Freedom House

About Freedom House



About Freedom House

Founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt and others, Freedom House is the oldest non-profit, non-governmental organization in the United States dedicated to promoting and defending democracy and freedom worldwide. Freedom House supports the global expansion of freedom through its advocacy activities, monitoring and in depth research on the state of freedom, and direct support of democratic reformers throughout the world.

Advocating Democracy and Human Rights

For over six decades, Freedom House has played an important role in identifying the key challenges to the global expansion of democracy, human rights and freedom. Freedom House is committed to advocating a vigorous U.S. engagement in international affairs that promotes human rights and freedom around the world.

Monitoring Freedom

Despite significant recent gains for freedom, hundreds of millions of people around the world continue to endure dictatorship, repression, and the denial of basic rights. To shed light on the obstacles to liberty, Freedom House issues studies, surveys, and reports on the condition of global freedom. Our research is meant to illuminate the nature of democracy, identify its adversaries, and point the way for policies that strengthen and expand democratic freedoms. Freedom House projects are designed to support the framework of rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Supporting Democratic Change

The attainment of freedom ultimately depends on the actions of courageous men and women who are committed to the transformation of their societies. But history has repeatedly demonstrated that outside support can play a critical role in the struggle for democratic rights. Freedom House is actively engaged in these struggles, both in countries where dictatorship holds sway and in those societies that are in transition from autocracy to democracy. Freedom House functions as a catalyst for freedom by working to strengthen civil society, promote open government, defend human rights, enhance justice, and facilitate the free flow of information and ideas.

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